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Abstract 
 
This research draws on the system dynamics methodology to investigate, through a 
dynamic study of Myanmar’s jadeite industry that goes from the year 2000 to 2022, the 
causes of fluctuating purchases of mining equipment at one of Myanmar’s major distributors 
of heavy machinery. Supported by data from multiple online sources and interviews to two of 
Myanmar’s major mining companies, a simulation model is developed to dynamically explain 
the behavior of the industry. It is hypothesized demand and supply loops, coupled with delays 
of various nature, act to cause instability and oscillations in Myanmar’s jade mining 
industry and subsequently in the demand of mining equipment. Results from the model show 
that in the face of a “mining rush” scenario, one in which the tendency of the government is 
to grant substantially more mining licenses than the base case, jade reserves are exhausted 
quickly and even get depleted within the simulation interval. In contrast, when less licenses 
than usual are granted, the market keeps requiring equipment for a longer time period, and 
the fact that reserves are not exhausted as quick, implies mineable land concessions and 
equipment purchases continue to take place, and that the sustainability or survival of UMG 
as a firm is not compromised as quick. However, in both scenarios (“base case” and “mining 
rush”) jade production peaks at different points in time to then follow an imminent 
collapsing trend. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis to the parameters (a) tons per acre, and 
(b) initial jade reserves show greater or lesser values do not alter the collapsing behavior of 
jade production and equipment purchases, but simply move sales and production curves to 
upper or lower boundaries. Finally, a structure for financial assessment is added to the 
model to show that in the face of a “mining rush scenario,” not favorable prices, and the due 
computation of a formal financial analysis, negative NPV results (from jade prices not being 
able to keep up with the vast amount of new machinery a boom in mining licenses requires) 
will deter license applications and will most likely be reflected into less purchases of 
equipment. This research is significantly relevant in that (a) it explains the fluctuations of 
equipment purchases dynamically, (b) results warn UMG about the imminent depletion of 
mineable land and with that the decay of its business, and (c) it sheds light on the research 
question, it explains the behavior of Myanmar’s jade industry based on empirical data, 
something that has not been previously done.   
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Introduction!
Multiple studies have identified customer demand as “the ultimate driver of 
business management and performance” (Levis & Papageorgiou, 2005) and “the most 
basic tool of empirical industrial organization” (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, & Pakes, 
2005).  From the perspective of the firm, customer demand is the force that guides 
decisions on production and distribution capacities, sales and marketing budgets, 
human resource planning, and even research and development activities across 
different industries (Goodwin, Dyussekeneva, & Meeran, 2012). Failing to accurately 
forecast customer demand can result in undesired high inventory costs, low customer 
satisfaction, and even loss of market share in the medium to long term (Gupta, 
Maranas, & McDonald, 2000).  
From the customer perspective, the assurance of product availability becomes 
particularly important in circumstances where factors like seasonality confine 
operations to only a fraction of the year. In this context, product availability ensures 
planned production schedules are carried out and expected profitability achieved.  
Recognition of the pivotal importance of customer demand forecasts on 
product availability is what motivated United Machinery Group (UMG) to 
commission a study that investigates the causes of fluctuating product demand 
among their customer base. UMG is a Myanmar-based supplier of heavy equipment 
that distributes, among many other products, excavators, dump trucks, and air 
compressors to local construction and mining companies. Although revenues from 
customers in the construction segment are significant, revenues generated by mining 
companies accounted for 70% of the total revenues perceived by UMG in 2011. 
Because most customers in the mining industry are engaged in jade mining, the 
behavior of Myanmar’s jade mining industry is deemed as key in determining 
forecasts of equipment sales.  
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Jade mining involves the extraction of jade from alluvial or in-situ deposits. 
Jade is a semiprecious stone classified either into jadeite or nephrite that is shaped 
mostly into ornaments and jewelry. Although jade occurrences in Myanmar are 
specifically of jadeite, for simplicity purposes the generic word “jade” will be used 
throughout the text from now on. 
Myanmar’s jade industry can be described as one in which two well 
identifiable players interact: Myanmar being endowed with the most precious jadeite 
deposits worldwide, and China being the primary consumers of the jadeite mined in 
its neighbor’s mines. The fact the geology, extraction, appraisal, and consumption of 
jade involve a great deal detail has prompted most stakeholders in Myanmar’s jade 
mining industry to believe the industry is completely unpredictable and therefore 
undecipherable. The secrecy involved in all aspects of the industry, induced by the 
undisclosed policies of Myanmar’s military, further exacerbates this unpredictability 
sentiment.  
In this thesis, the author adopts the system dynamics methodology to propose 
a dynamic hypothesis in which demand and supply loops, coupled with delays of 
various nature in the system (i.e. perception delay, payment from sales delay, license 
approval delay, equipment delivery delay, production delay), act to cause instability 
and oscillations in Myanmar’s jade mining industry and subsequently in the 
purchases of mining equipment. Validation tests prove the model to be insensitive to 
parameter changes and headed to inevitable decay in the long run.  
The findings from this thesis are of major significance both for the client firm 
and other major players in Myanmar’s jade industry. First, this research is 
unprecedented in that it challenges current widespread beliefs about the 
“quantification impossibility” of the different parameters and relationships that 
interact in Myanmar’s jade industry. Second and last, it uses aggregate industry data 
not only to test a dynamic hypothesis of industry behavior to provide conclusions on 
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the fluctuations of customer equipment demand, but also to show how the 
development of the jade industry feedbacks into the system until the inevitable 
exhaustion of mineable land and jade reserves prevent activities of mining 
companies, equipment suppliers, traders, and so on from continuing further.  
 The different components of this thesis have been organized as follows: 
chapter 1 provides the context for this research and an introduction to the client 
firm; chapter 2 reviews some of the most important studies conducted in the field of 
system dynamics, mining, and the study of mineral industries; chapter 3 describes 
the problem and research questions for this study; chapter 4 briefly mentions the 
methodology used for developing the study and gathering data; chapter 5 describes 
the hypothesis that explains the problem dynamically; chapter 6 introduces the stock 
and flow structure of the simulation model with the corresponding justification for 
different parameters values and relationships; chapter 7 discusses model behavior and 
model validation; chapter 8 proposes a policy for the proper financial evaluation of 
mining development initiatives; and finally chapter 9 discusses the conclusions and 
limitations of this research.  
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Chapter 1. Research context  
This research was commissioned by Win Strategic’s owner and general 
manager to investigate the dynamics involved in the fluctuation of customers’ 
purchases of equipment. The research material used for this thesis draws on a wide 
array of data sources and was collected throughout a 3-month period in Yangon, 
Myanmar. Provided the scarce disclosure, and therefore unreliable nature of the data 
related to Myanmar’s mining industry, fieldwork was imperative to gain a truly 
realistic perspective of how operations both at the client firm and at the mines sites 
are carried out. Before describing the client firm, a written portrait of Myanmar and 
its natural resources is provided.   
1.1. A brief introduction to Myanmar and its mineral resources 
Rich in a variety of natural resources, among them the world’s most precious 
rubies and jade stones, “Myanmar” or “Burma” has remained as one of the poorest 
nations in Southeast Asia suffering from continued isolation and poverty since the 
military junta led by General Ne Win took power in 1962.  
Figure 1 Myanmar and its neighbors  
[Source: The World Bank (2012c)] 
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Home to more than one hundred ethno-linguistic groups, Myanmar has also 
been subject to a long-lasting armed conflict between the central government and a 
range of armed ethnic groups that extends until present times (South, 2012) and 
threatens the well being and lives of many. Most of such armed conflicts take place 
especially in the area where most jade reserves lie.  
Despite a long history of autocratic rule, slight changes in favor of 
democratization have sprouted in the last two years. In late March 2011 a new civil 
government led by president Thein Sein took place, and in April 2012 three dozen 
members of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), including 
her, took parliamentary oath at office, marking a pivotal milestone in the history of 
the country. 
Although the junta ceded power last year, serving and retired military officers 
still dominate government as well as civil service seats at all levels and run an 
extensive network of state economic enterprises and government-organized 
nongovernmental organizations (Pedersen, 2011). It is in the framework of such a 
ruthless and totalitarian military-led state that mining operations have taken place 
in the last 40 years: government officials favoring small groups, receiving 
extraordinarily high amounts of income derived from the sale of gems (from which 
mining workers do not participate), and failing to be accountable for the 
environmental and human right catastrophe in which mining operations in Myanmar 
have resulted.  
1.2. About the client firm  
Win Strategic is a Yangon-based business conglomerate that consists of three 
stand-alone firms: (a) UMG Myanmar (main operational one), (b) WIN Food (food 
business), and (c) WIN Resources (jade and gold mines) (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2 Organizational structure of Win Strategic 
Established back in 1998, UMG is recognized as one of Myanmar’s major 
distributors of heavy machinery today. Equipment is first imported from different 
countries in Southeast Asia and then sold to mining and construction companies 
locally. UMG also operates a service network consisting of 18 branches that provide 
sales and technical support all over the country. In recent years, sales operations 
have expanded through overseas subsidiaries that now operate in Cambodia, Sri 
Lanka, Papua New Guinea, Laos, Singapore, and soon Vietnam.      
It is worth pointing out that although construction/mining equipment 
represented UMG’s entire business focus since 1998 until 2011, today the company, 
partly as a result of Myanmar’s most recent political and economic reforms, has 
established four other business units that include (a) trucks, (b) power generation, 
(c) automotive, and (d) motorcycles/lubricants. All the information presented in this 
research relates only to UMG’s construction and mining equipment business unit.  
1.2.1. Mining and UMG 
19 products of 18 different brands make up UMG’s construction/mining 
equipment product portfolio. Items in the portfolio include excavators, dump trucks, 
drill machines, air compressors, dozers, loaders, compactors, and haulers, among 
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others. In terms of revenue contribution by product group, excavators accounted for 
approximately 60% of UMG’s total revenues in 2011, while dump trucks and other 
construction equipment for 25%, and 15% respectively (see Figure 3). Note again 
that prior to 2012, UMG’s product portfolio consisted solely of construction and 
mining equipment and not cars or motorcycles.  
In regards to industry segmentation, while revenues from dump trucks are 
100% traceable to the mining sector, about 60% of revenues from both excavators 
and other equipment can be attributed to the mining industry and the remaining 
40% to the construction industry (UMG, 2011) (see Figure 4). It can therefore be 
concluded around 70% of the total revenues generated by UMG in 2011 were 
generated by mining firms, especially by those engaged in jade mining. The need to 
understand the evolution of Myanmar’s jade industry and its possible impact on the 
company’s finances and overall sustainability becomes now more apparent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 (left) Revenue contribution by product group in 2011 
Figure 4 (right) Revenue generation by industry in 2011 
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UMG and other main actors 
Figure 5 summarizes the terminology that will be used throughout this 
text when referring to the main parties interacting with UMG. Suppliers or 
principals refer to UMG’s suppliers of construction and mining equipment located 
in neighboring Asian countries. UMG stands as the client firm of this project and 
one of the major importers/distributors of construction and mining equipment in 
Myanmar. Last, mining firms refer to the local buyers of the construction and 
mining equipment commercialized by UMG or in other words, UMG’s customers. 
Arrows connecting each player symbolize the equipment supply chain, meaning 
the flow of equipment from principals to UMG and from UMG to the final 
customer. 
Figure 5 Main actors and their relationship with UMG 
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
2.1. The mining industry as a complex system 
 If one understands the definition of a complex system as one that is multi-
variable, multi-feedback, and also one that exhibits non-linearities and time delays, 
there is no absolute doubt both the mining firm and the mining industry could be 
labeled as complex systems on their own. On one hand, a contemporary mining firm 
is a complex system in which decision making is both focused on (a) regularly 
adjusting mine management policies, as guided by current mine output, in order to 
meet planned production schedules and achieve desired profitability levels, and on 
(b) determining how and where such earned profits should be reinvested in the form 
of further exploration and development projects (O'Regan & Moles, 2006 ).  
On the other hand, the mining enterprise is only one of the many elements 
within a broader complex system at the industry level. Interacting with mining 
companies are demand forces, the supply of capital goods and financial services, 
governmental policies, the environment, communities, and many more. Figure 6 
displays the multi-variable nature of Myanmar’s jade industry where arrows do not 
denote cause and effect relationships but instead the interchange of technical, 
physical, and economic resources among the different stakeholders in the industry. 
Feedback, non-linear relationships, and time delays within the mining industry are 
not part of this introduction and will be covered extensively in the further chapters.  
Although not in the case of mining firms in Myanmar, most international 
mining companies rely on borrowed funds to support the exploration of new mineral 
bodies. Financial resources then flow from investors/creditors to mining firms as 
capital disbursements are completed and finally from mining firms back to 
investors/creditors when repayments are made.  Similarly, vendors and contractors 
are in possession of mining equipment, raw material, and geologic and economic 
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information that is given to mining companies in exchange for a financial benefit. 
The same applies to workers who get remunerated in exchange for the skills or 
knowledge they bring to the workplace.  
 
Figure 6 Myanmar’s jade mining value system  
[Adapted from White (2008)] 
Besides private parties, governments also take part in the resource exchange 
mechanism by receiving license revenues and royalty payments on production when 
they give away land, in the form of mining licenses, to mining companies. In the case 
of Myanmar, land comes at the expense of hundreds of villagers whose homes are 
expropriated for absurd monetary compensations. Bribes to the Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA), Myanmar´s most prominent ethnic militia, could also be seen as 
monetary compensations on behalf of mining companies to justify the extraction of 
the mineral resources that belong to the Kachin ethnic group. When contributions 
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are not materialized, mining firms take of risk of seeing their operations abruptly 
disrupted.   
Besides resources traveling back and forth between mining firms and the 
government or ethnic nationalities, interchanges between mining firms and the 
environment also occur. Just as in many other mining locations around the world, it 
has been reported mining operations in Myanmar have caused tremendous 
environmental degradation not only in the form of destroyed large tracts of what 
used to be green and habitable land, but also as recurrent deathly floodings and 
landslides that result from rainwater overshooting riverbanks where mining waste 
has been irresponsibly deposited (Images Asia & Pan Kachin Development Society, 
2004). Environmental ruin is then the by-product that flows from mining companies 
back to the environment.  
Last, mining companies commercialize raw jade to primary buyers who then 
resell jewelry or other jade-based ornaments to a secondary market. Note these 
transactions not only refer to the sale of jade through legitimate channels but also 
through illegal trading networks that have historically extended to Thailand and 
China (Chang, 2004). In both cases, money is what flows back to both the mining 
company and the jade manufacturer in exchange for jade.  
2.2. Previous studies in mining 
Despite the undeniable interrelated nature of the elements present in a mining 
industry, extensive studies have been mostly written within the framework of specific 
academic disciplines such as economics, finance, information technology, engineering, 
ecology, chemistry, geology, or archeology. Significantly less has been documented on 
Myanmar’s jade and jade mining, and nothing, to the knowledge of the author, on 
the dynamics of Myanmar’s jade industry. Given this reality, the following lines will 
present a review of what has been said about mining industries in general.  
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In perhaps one of the first and few models that display industry-wide 
interactions, Clough, Levine, Mowbray, and Walter (1965) make use of five 
subsectors (i.e. demand, government, operating mine, mine management, and closed 
mine) to simulate, using the system dynamics methodology, the effects of various 
government subsidies on Canada’s uranium mining industry and their effects on 
production, employment, and finances both for the mining firm and the government. 
This study proves particularly insightful in showing how governmental policies 
related to subsidies can not only affect production rates but also the financial 
sustainability of mining firms and the communities whose lives and jobs revolve 
around the mining activity.  
Similarly, in his seminal work on commodity cycles, (Meadows, 1970) adopts a 
holistic and more behavioral perspective when explaining how long-term commodity 
cycles in hog, cattle, and poultry markets are inherent to the interrelations of supply 
and demand forces and not explained by random influences or shocks as commonly 
thought. Because the model is a generic one that could be applied to any other 
mineral commodity such as nickel or tungsten, this reference is indeed greatly linked 
to the mining industry.   
 More recently, O'Regan and Moles (2002) present a system dynamics model 
that analyzes the exploration, development, and extraction patterns of 20 
multinational mining firms as they explore mining investments in four different 
countries over a 100-year period. This model is particularly helpful in portraying how 
different deposits in different locations might prove economic or uneconomic 
depending not only on the country’s level of geological endowments but also on the 
set of regulatory requirements posed by each country and the different growth and 
extraction profiles of the different players (i.e. passive, sensitive, aggressive). 
Other system dynamics models concerned with mining have focused on the 
optimization of mining operations and the exploration of different financial scenarios 
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for mining conglomerates (Alpagut & Celebi, 2003). For instance, Wolstenholme and 
Holmes (1985) report on applications for mine planning (i.e. the optimization of an 
underground colliery), Wolstenholme (1980) on equipment selection (i.e. the 
optimization of blinker-conveyor belt system for coal haulage), Montaldo (1977) on 
the dynamics of an underground metal mine, Xiwen (2001) on the dynamics of 
checking and ratifying mine production capacity, and finally (Coyle, 1977) on 
corporate financial planning for a traditional international mining company. Except 
for the latter, most of these system dynamics based studies could be classified as 
pure mining engineering applications as they deal exclusively with the operation and 
management of a mine. 
Last, acknowledging the scarcity of studies that examine the evolution of the 
mining industry in a particular country, Russell, Shapiro, and Vining (2010) use two 
theoretical approaches to industry evolution (i.e. density-dependence theory and 
variants of industrial organization economics), coupled with regulatory punctuation 
(i.e. sudden regulatory changes), to investigate the evolution pattern of mining firms 
in Canada between 1929 and 2006. The study concludes that even though neither 
theory can explain the birth or death of Canadian mining firms, there is evidence 
that the introduction of environmental legislation and tax reforms during the 1970s 
altered the cost structure of the industry in such a way that a decline in firm 
numbers was witnessed. Similar to an “event study,” and markedly different from a 
holistic view of the industry, this study focuses on exogenous forces to explain the 
growth and decline of mining firms regardless of the many other aspects 
acknowledged in a mining system.  
This section navigated through major studies both outside and within the 
framework of system dynamics to shed light on the literature gaps this study could 
address. Mostly similar to the last reference, this thesis evades an event-oriented 
explanation and mostly focuses on dynamic interactions to explain industry behavior.   
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Chapter 3. Problem definition and research questions 
Having examined why Myanmar’s mining industry can be identified as 
dynamic and having reviewed past research about the mining industry, the following 
two sections will define the problem under study in a dynamic way and will list the 
research questions for this study.  
3.1. Dynamic problem 
 “The problem is related to the investment behavior of jade 
miners which is not consistent; sometimes they make very big orders, 
then they disappear; thus, it is difficult for us to plan and we lose 
opportunities” 
K.A., General Manager & Owner 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 help identifying the pattern and magnitude of the 
inconsistent purchases UMG’s general manager referred to. While Figure 7 displays 
mining equipment purchases for five selected UMG customers from 2000 until 2011, 
Figure 8 presents an aggregated account of the total mining equipment units 
purchased by all UMG customers during the same time period. Both individual and 
aggregated purchases display oscillatory behavior, peaking every three years with all 
peaks corresponding to the same years (i.e. 2004, 2007, 2010).  
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Figure 7 Yearly equipment purchases of 5 selected customers  
Figure 8 Aggregate yearly purchases of mining equipment  
Since UMG’s market share is believed to be around 60%, it is critical to 
evaluate whether the purchasing trends of UMG customers can serve as a proxy to 
industry behavior so as to derive conclusions about jade depletion and the 
subsequent stagnation of jade mining and equipment purchases. A look at 
Myanmar’s jade production is perhaps necessary to crosscheck the possible effect of 
equipment purchases on aggregate jade production.  
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Yearly figures for jade production in tons from 1995 until 2010 (see  
Figure 9), show oscillation with periods of 3 years just as the purchases of 
mining equipment. When Figure 8 and  
Figure 9 are closely analyzed, as in Figure 10, in it can be noticed jade 
production follows purchases of jade equipment exactly after 1 year. [Note data for 
jade production in Figure 10 has been divided by 100 to fit into the graph]  
Figure 9 Jade production in tons from 1995 until 2010 
Figure 10 Equipment purchases vs. jade production 
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Figure 11 Inferred behavior of jade production and jade reserves 
 
Figure 11 shows how the boom in jade production is thought to have 
materialized at the expense of jade reserves. As production continues to rise, jade 
reserves continue to be exhausted by mining companies until their unavoidable 
depletion prevents production from increasing further.  
Figure 12 Emporium revenues (in USD millions) 
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Last, Figure 12 reveals inferred and actual reported revenues of government 
sponsored gem auctions from 2000 until 2011 (gem auctions are described in detail in 
section 6.3.5.3.1). While the light green shaded area represents the official reports on 
revenues in millions of USD, the dark green shaded area symbolizes the suspected 
non-reported or unofficial revenues from jade trade. In fact, Pick and Thein (2010) 
report that “a large proportion of economic activity in Myanmar is off the books to 
the point where the unofficial economy (including opium and jade trading) is at least 
as large as the size of the official economy.”  
The problem under study is one centered on investigating the causes of 
oscillations that characterize equipment purchases from UMG. Jade production, jade 
prices, and suspected revenues from emporium sales have also been presented as 
means to draw a more complete picture on the effects of mining equipment additions 
on other industry indicators. Drawing from an industry-level understanding, the 
author expects to unveil the causes of the presented problematic behavior. 
Furthermore, industry behavior is also crucial at determining not only the pace and 
magnitude of future purchases, but also the sustainability of mining firms and UMG 
in the long run. For a brief complementary note on the process of building these 
reference modes, refer to Appendix 1.  
3.2. Why are fluctuating purchases a problem to UMG? 
As a consequence of a heavy rainy season or “monsoon,” mining companies in 
Myanmar are forced to fully cease operations during May, June, July, and August of 
every year. In such circumstances, where only 8 out of the 12 months in the year are 
active, the guarantee of equipment availability and the avoidance of other major 
disruptions such as equipment breakdowns are of significant importance to jade 
miners.  
A delay or pause in jade extraction caused by lack of equipment availability 
not only costs millions of US dollars in lost revenues to the mining firms but also 
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endangers customer satisfaction and results in lost sales for UMG. When the 
opposite happens and equipment availability is higher than it would have otherwise 
been, warehousing costs are incurred, as equipment must now be stored until there is 
demand for it. An understanding of the underlying causes of oscillatory purchases is 
therefore essential for UMG to ensure equipment availability at all times.  
3.3. Research questions 
The system dynamics presented in this thesis is intended to answer the 
following three questions:  
• Why is the investment behavior of jade mining firms cyclical? 
• Which investment scheme can result in more stability for both jade mining 
firms and UMG?  
• Which growth objective should be pursued by UMG given the years of 
jade extraction until exhaustion?   
By having a deep understanding of the elements and relationships that lie 
behind customers’ purchasing behavior, it is expected UMG’s current ordering policy 
will better address customers’ needs thus ensuring product availability and achieving 
target loyalty levels. Furthermore, insights from the model will shed light on UMG’s 
corporate sustainability and on the future of Myanmar’s jade industry in general. 
3.4. Time horizon  
 Because the main research question relates to the purchasing behavior of 
UMG customers, the year in which sales of heavy equipment took off in Myanmar 
seems an appropriate departure point. Evidence suggests it was not until 2000 when 
manpower was replaced by mining equipment in Myanmar’s mining areas (AKSYU, 
2008 ). Before this year, most mining was artisanal, thus labor intensive and based 
on rudimentary methods and tools (Smith, 2007).  
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In regards to the end of the “jade rush era,” locals estimate jade reserves will 
deplete in around 10 years from today (i.e. some say 6, others 15, others simply 
“soon”). The simulation interval has been consequently set to start in 2000 and 
extend until 2022, not only to match predictions about jade depletion but also to 
capture the delayed and indirect effects of potential policies (Sterman, 2000).  
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Chapter 4. Methodology, data sources, and glossary 
4.1. Methodology 
As explained in the literature review, system dynamics is suitable for systems 
where the presence of time delays, feedbacks, and non-linearities are present. The 
jade industry is certainly one of such systems and will therefore be modeled following 
the modeling steps suggested in Sterman (2000).  
4.2. Data sources  
 
Figure 13 summarizes the main data sources used for this research project 
along with their corresponding “accessing method” (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010 
).  
Figure 13 Research sources and accessing methods 
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Guided by the nature of the proposed research question, input from UMG 
employees and jade mining companies seemed of great relevance to understand the 
decision rules that govern UMG customers’ purchases of mining equipment. Semi-
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definitions, and stories common to all respondents (Luna-Reyes & Andersen, 2003 ). 
Furthermore, in order to try to approach respondents’ own concepts within a 
systemic framework Richardson (2006), a concept model was used to begin each 
interview. The concept model shown in Figure 14 proved helpful at introducing the 
system dynamics iconography that later on served as a strong foundation for model 
validation with some of the interviewees at the end of different model iterations.   
Figure 14 Concept model used in interviews 
One of UMG sales officers, one of its senior salesman, and two branch 
managers participated as interviewees for this research project. Additionally, two 
former customers of UMG, one of them perhaps one of the biggest mining companies 
in Myanmar, and two local PhD geologists constituted other essential sources of 
information as well.  
4.2.2. Content analysis  
Because Myanmar´s military government appears reluctant to release truthful 
economic and social data, most information related to Myanmar’s jade industry is to 
be found in secondary sources such as online newspapers, magazines, blogs, or 
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few foreign gemologists have been granted government permission to visit Myanmar’s 
mining areas and consequently only few journal articles have been published on the 
state of Myanmar’s jade mining (Hughes, 1999). Publications and reports as well as 
other online resources were used as means to get acquainted with the subject matter 
and were accessed via content analysis. 
4.3. Glossary  
Though most of the terms used in this research are of general knowledge, 
there are some that pertain particularly to mining and hence deserve a short 
definition.   
• Gem: a mineral or organic substance, cut and polished, and used as an 
ornament (Lagassé & Columbia University, 2000). Along with stones like 
aquamarine, quartz, and amethyst, jade belongs to the gem subgroup of 
semiprecious stones. 
• Imperial jadeite: an emerald-green, translucent form jadeite often referred 
to as "imperial jade" or "gem jade." In Myanmar this type of jadeite is 
referred to as “mya yay” or “yay kyauk.” (Howard, 2002). 
• Ore: an metal-bearing mineral mass that can be profitably mined (Lagassé 
& Columbia University, 2000).  
• Grade: the concentration of an element of interest, in this case jade, in a 
potentially mineable ore deposit (Allaby, 2008).  
• Open-pit: a mine where all the ground above the mineral deposits or coal is 
removed so that the miners can get to the mineral; also called an open-pit 
mine, strip mine, or surface mine (The Burma Environmental Working 
Group, 2011).  
• Emporium shows: government-controlled auctions selling different types of 
gems, including jade, and organized 3 times per year at Myanmar’s capital 
city Naypyidaw.  
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Chapter 5. Qualitative model description  
5.1. Model boundary chart 
Before describing the model qualitatively, and later on quantitatively, a model 
boundary chart will summarize the scope of the model by pointing out major 
endogenous, exogenous, and excluded variables (see  
Table 1).  
Table 1 Model boundary chart 
Endogenous variables are all those within each model subsector in Figure 15. 
Exogenous inputs are only two, namely (a) the growth fraction that drives the 
increase in the population of consumers, and (b) mining licenses.  Finally, excluded 
from the model are mine management dynamics, the dynamics of mine closure, the 
process by which big mining corporations subcontract jade mining operations to 
smaller ones when land concessions greatly exceed their expansion frontiers, the 
number of individual mining companies operating, and last, environmental and 
community dynamics. 
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5.2. Dynamic hypothesis 
Figure 15 shows a simplification of the underlying feedback structure 
responsible for the oscillations in jade production and equipment purchases. Physical, 
perceptual, and administrative delays important to the behavior of the system are 
also explicit in this basic model by means of delay marks in some of the variable 
links. Figure 15 also shows the relationships among the three most important model 
subsectors: (a) land, (b) production, and (c) market.  
 
Figure 15 Model subsectors 
Generally speaking, when more land is passed to mining companies (land 
subsector), jade supply or production increases (production subsector), thus affecting 
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prices through changes in inventory coverage (market subsector). Market prices 
feedback into consumption in the demand side, and into capacity expansion and 
capacity utilization in the supply side. Each of these interactions will be expanded 
further in the following sections.  
5.3. Dynamic hypothesis  
Demand and supply loops, coupled with delays of various nature in the 
system, act to cause instability and oscillations in Myanmar’s jade mining industry 
and subsequently in the purchases of mining equipment. On the supply side, high 
prices lead to higher utilization of current capacity in the short-term (B4).  When 
high prices persist, mining companies expand by applying for more mining licenses 
and by acquiring more equipment to cope with new land concessions (B5). Note that 
while utilization decisions are made based on the difference between variable costs 
and price, no financial analysis is computed (not event among the biggest mining 
companies) for land expansion decisions. Later in this document, a stock-and-flow 
structure for financial analysis will be incorporated to the model to test whether 
development decisions would have resulted in something different in the face of prior 
financial assessments.  
Jade prices depend on the balance between demand and supply. Stocks of raw 
jade increase with increased production and decrease with the sales rate controlled 
by the demand or consumption of jade. Prices increase when the inventory coverage 
falls (inventory coverage is defined as the ratio of inventory to consumption) and 
vice-versa. Although the existence of substitute goods also influences price, the model 
assumes jadeite jade has none given its legendary and unique significance to the 
Chinese society (main buyers of the green stone). For the Chinese, there is simply no 
other stone that could replace jade in any respect. Therefore inventory coverage is 
taken as the only determinant of price in this model.  
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On the demand side, it has been empirically found jade consumption increases 
with increases in price, emulating the demand curve of a Veblen good (R1). When 
consumption increases, inventory decreases, and jade prices soar. Price increases 
encourage land and capacity expansion among jade mining companies. However, 
because production cannot adjust immediately, inventories continue to be depleted. 
Once initiated, production accumulates in excess of demand, which despite being 
high remains less than supply. Inventory coverage is now high, prices drop, and land 
expansion stabilizes given the inability of lower prices to support further expansion. 
Balancing feedback loops in the system coupled with delays of diverse nature are 
responsible for the oscillations that characterize Myanmar’s jade mining industry. 
The subsequent sections (starting by the acre and jade aging chains and followed by 
the effects of price on utilization, expansion and consumption) will expand on the 
dynamic descriptions for each of the loops involved in the jade industry model.  
5.3.1. Acre aging chain 
The acre aging chain replicates the transfer of land from the central 
government to jade mining companies. In accordance with Myanmar ‘s mines law of 
1994, “all naturally occurring minerals found either on or under the soil of any land 
in the continental shelf are deemed to be owned by the state” (Ministry of Mines, 
2004). This translates into the exclusive and official rights of the government to 
approve all land and water concessions related to mining. 
Within this context, “acres available,” meaning pristine or not exploited land, 
are first transferred from government hands to mining companies through mining 
licenses. After a production delay, jade resources start to be mined and the land 
stripped. Utilized or stripped land finally accumulates in the stock of “acres used.” 
As it will be explained in section 8.4, stripped land in Myanmar is not rehabilitated 
or vegetated further after mining operations have come to an end. Therefore, a flow 
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that connects the stock of “acres used” back to “acres available” has not been 
included. Loops B1 and B2, part of the acre again-chain, are described next.  
5.3.2. B1 – “Land depletion”  
Consider the structure of the balancing loop 
B1 or the “land depletion loop” in the acre aging 
chain. The more the licenses are granted for mining, 
and in consequence the more the land given away 
to miners, the less the land available for further 
mining concessions. The balancing loop 1 denotes 
the “carrying capacity” of the system in relation to available land. In other words, 
regardless of market demand, the gradual exhaustion of economically mineable land 
will mark the gradual decrease in license granting at some point in time.  
5.3.3. B2 – “Production limit”  
Balancing loop 2, named the “production 
limit” loop, limits jade extraction whenever the 
stock of acres granted proves inadequate. The 
more the acres ceded to mining companies, the 
more the land exploitation and jade extraction, 
and the more the exploitation and extraction, the 
less the land remaining for further works.  
5.3.4. Jade aging chain 
The jade aging chain is a 3-stock supply chain that shows the movement of 
jade out of the reserves, via jade production, to the stock of jade in warehouses, and 
finally to the stock jade ready for sale. The stock of jade reserves is formulated as 
the product of the initial acres available and the parameter tons per acre. The 
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dilution fraction (explained in detail in section 0) prevents all mined and stored jade 
to be put for sale. In the last stage, the product of per-capita consumption and 
population of consumers drains the stock of jade for sale through purchases. An 
explanation of loops B3, B4, B5, and R1 follows next.  
5.3.5. B3 – “Jade depletion”  
Similar to B1, balancing loop B3 denotes 
the process through which, along with mineable 
land, mineable reserves are also depleted as a 
result of resource use or jade extraction.  
Though not literally exhausted, the term 
scarcity of gems is normally used to indicate 
the “decreasing concentrations of mineral 
resources at some time in the far future” (Brent & Hietkamp, 2006).  
 Reserves exhaustion is irreversible given the finite, and hence non-renewable, 
nature of jade deposits. In this respect, mention should be also made of the current 
mining situation in Myanmar perfectly fitting the tragedy of the commons dilemma, 
in which “the more users there are, the more resource is used; the more resource is 
used, the less there is per user” (Meadows & Wright, 2008). Translated to B3, the 
more the licenses, the more the acres granted; the more the acres granted, the more 
the jade production; the more the production, the less the reserves; and finally the 
less the reserves, the less the license granting. 
Because there is no incentive for the government or the mining companies to 
preserve the resources shared by the commons (i.e. mineable land and jade deposits), 
overextraction of jade is taking place by jeopardizing entire villages through 
ecologically damaging mining techniques banned everywhere else (EarthRights 
Interantional, 2007), land erosion, deforestation, polluted rivers, floods, landslides, 
and social and health costs absorbed the communities involved.  
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The tragedy of the commons arises from the delayed or missing feedback from 
the state of the resource to the growth in the amount of users who take advantage of 
the resource. The latter increase jade production at a rate that is not influenced by 
the condition of the commons. This detachment holds true for jade, as reported in 
Howard (2002): 
“There is a subsidiary claim that "the stock of the best-quality 
jade is getting smaller." Perhaps, but again substantiating evidence is 
lacking and it is likely that in the face of increasing demand for high 
quality jadeite there is the perception of a shrinking pool of "good- 
quality" jadeite, whereas the actual situation is that the supply of good 
quality jadeite is proving unable to keep pace with growing demand” 
Unless meaningful changes at the government level divert the course of gem 
mining from indiscriminate depletion and irresponsible environmental damage, jade 
along with other mineral resources in Myanmar will be wiped out and all users who 
benefited from it ruined.  
5.3.6. The role of prices on utilization, expansion, and 
consumption 
In the model, prices play a 
critical role by determining changes 
in (a) capacity utilization, (b) land 
expansion, and (c) consumption. In 
the first case, short-term 
expectations of a high price 
encourage higher utilization of 
installed capacity to raise production 
and consequently profitability. In the 
second case, long-term expectations of high prices motivate mining companies to 
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expand production by acquiring, through mining licenses, more mineable land. In 
regards to industry demand, it is hypothesized that for the case of jade higher prices 
lead to higher consumption.  
In the three cases, different adjustment delays form first-order responses in 
assessing profitability for utilization and expansion decisions, as well as in forming 
price expectations on consumers. Once expectations are formed, physical delays in 
the utilization and expansion loops prevent production and inventories from rising 
instantaneously. Note also that except for the last case, utilization and expansion 
lead to higher production, bringing prices down again via increased inventories and 
inventory coverage.  
5.3.7. B4 – “Higher prices lead to higher utilization” 
Utilization depends on mining 
companies’ short-term expectations of 
profitability of operations. When prices rise, 
the fastest measure that can be implemented to 
take advantage of the expected profitability is 
to use installed capacity to raise production. In 
Myanmar, the two mining companies 
interviewed reported most companies increase production temporarily when jade 
prices increase. A jump in jade production is possible given mining equipment only 
operates 20 hours per day and not 24 as in most mining industries anywhere else. 
Also, some companies might continue mining operations during the first days of the 
“wet monsoon season” (a description of monsoon in provided in section 6.3.4.2.1).  
Because decisions towards price changes are not made immediately and after 
that utilization cannot be adjusted instantly (i.e. new shifts for machine operators 
must be ensured for instance), a delay mark lies on the arrow linking price and 
expected profitability of utilization, and utilization and production respectively. 
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When increased utilization is finally a reality, jade production rises, inventories 
increase as inventory coverage does, and prices fall as a result.   
5.3.8. B5 – “Higher prices lead to more licenses”  
 Balancing loop 6 
shows the effect of jade 
mining companies’ long-term 
price expectations on 
additions to capacity. When 
stocks of warehoused jade 
are lower than desired, 
inventory coverage 
decreases, causing increases in price. Higher prices raise miners’ price forecasts 
prompting them to expand by applying for more licenses and after a delay, proceed 
with purchases of equipment. Equipment orders are not only affected by land 
concession, but also by financial flows, that either allow or constraint purchases, the 
equipment scrapping rate, and UMG’s product availability. When equipment is 
finally obtained, production kicks off, increasing stocks of inventory, restoring 
inventory coverage, and bringing price down again.  
5.3.9. R1 – “Higher prices lead to higher consumption”  
Different from the demand function identified in commodity cycles, purchases 
of jade and other gems increase with increases in price (refer to section 6.3.5.3.2.2 for 
a more detailed explanation). The green arrow in R1 suggests that besides altering 
utilization and fueling producers’ desires for further expansion, higher prices also 
trigger higher per-capita consumption, thus slowly bringing down inventory levels, 
and causing slight increases in price. 
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Chapter 6. Stock-and-flow model structure  
A summarized causal diagram in Chapter 5 emphasized the feedback structure 
causing oscillations in the production of jade. Now, a description of the complete 
stock-and-flow is incorporated in order to emphasize the exact physical structure of 
the model, and the assumptions, justifications, and mathematical formulation behind 
it.  
The following list introduces the notation used across the model to 
differentiate among subsectors and special parameters: 
• LND or land: denotes the land available for mining, the land being used by 
mining companies, and the total land already exploited; 
• PROD or production: denotes the process of determining mining 
equipment requirements and the actual extraction of jade; 
• MRK or market: denotes all market-related variables such as consumer 
demand, jade prices, and demand for mining licenses; 
• GOVMT or government: denotes government related elements such as 
taxes on emporium transactions; 
• FIN or financial: tracks cash inflows and outflows resulting from mining-
related transactions; 
• NPV or net present value: denotes the discounted cash flow analysis 
performed in the model for mining development projects; 
• EFF or effects: denotes a graphical function; 
• SWITCH: denotes a switch parameter; 
• NOISE: denotes the intervention of noise in a variable. 
• SCE: parameter inputs for the scenarios presented in section 7.2.2. 
Each of these prefixes will appear in future sections at the moment of 
quantifying parameters or describing relationships among variables. Before starting, 
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a brief introduction to jadeite and its significance are provided as means to describe 
the gem around which most of the mining activity in Myanmar revolves.  
6.1. An introduction to jadeite 
The name jade is derived from the Spanish word “piedra de ijada,” or “stone 
of the flank” (it was believed to cure renal colic), and is a generic term for two 
different gems that differ from one another mainly in their chemical composition, 
texture, and colors. The first and most common type, nephrite jade, is a white-to-
green amphibole rock, also known as the “toughest natural stone on earth” (Hughes 
et al., 2000), that has the property of maintaining its integrity even when carved 
into delicate shapes (Naylor, 2010 ). The discovery of nephrite is attributed to the 
Chinese and its use for the fabrication of weapons and various ornaments extends 
back to around 5000 BC (Sax, Meeks, Michaelson, & Middletong, 2004).  
The second and most sought-after type, jadeite jade, is a pyroxene compact 
rock that can be found in white, yellow, brown, purple, black, and various shades of 
green to emerald green colors depending on the relative concentration of chemicals 
like chromium, manganese, or oxides of iron and manganese (Win, 1968) (see 
Appendix 2). Jadeite jade is rarer and more valuable than nephrite because it 
possesses all the wanted physical traits of the latter yet is also endowed with a 
specially vivid imperial green color (Naylor, 2010 ), greater translucency, and very 
fine and compact texture. Upon the discovery of jadeite in Myanmar in the 18th 
century, China’s passion for what is believed to be the “stone of heaven” (i.e. it 
connects heaven and earth) has grown incommensurably.  
Although jadeite can be also found in many other locations such as 
Guatemala, China or Russia, the world’s trop-grade most important jadeite deposits 
are confined in Myanmar (Ehrmann, 1957). Geologically unique, jadeite was formed 
at the place where the largest layers of the earth collided against each other on 
Myanmar’s Tawmaw plateau around 200 million years ago (Hughes, et al., 2000). As 
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a result of this collision, parts came out at very high speed to emerge as mountain 
ranges (Htwe, 2011). These ranges are known as jade “primary deposits” or deposits 
that hold their original relationship with their host rock (Schumann, 1997 ). Most 
jade extracted in Myanmar, though, comes from “secondary deposits” or rocks that 
have been washed away, transported, and deposited to a second location. While 
primary deposits are found in many parts of the Tawhmaw region, secondary 
deposits are located around Hpakan and other townships west of the Uru River.  
6.2. Jade mining method  
The type of gem deposit is the major determinant of the mining method to be 
chosen. Win (1968) classifies jade mines as dyke mines and boulder mines, the former 
being of primary nature in which fire is used to break up the jadeite underground, 
and the latter being of secondary occurrence in which pit, beds of streams, and 
sluicing methods of mining are used depending on the season. Although the mining 
operation is not explicitly represented in the model, the choice of mining method 
certainly influences the nature of the extraction rate. Therefore, the open-pit 
method, the one most extensively applied during the dry season when operations are 
ongoing, has been chosen as the framework for modeling the shape of gem-grade 
extraction.  
6.3. Overview of the stock and flow description 
The following subsections will go through the model’s structure following a 
logical sequence. Starting from the moment mining companies apply for a jade 
mining license, the descriptions explain the subsequent selection and purchase of 
equipment, the beginning of jade production, its storage and posterior sale, and 
finally the effect of inventories on prices, capacity expansion, capacity utilization, 
and consumption. At the end, a description of the model’s financial sector is also 
included.  
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6.3.1. Mining licenses 
Land is transferred to mining companies via mining licenses. It is crucial to 
have in mind that the number of licenses granted to jade mining is absolutely 
discretionary (Chovanec, 2011) and that the exploitation of jade mines by private 
companies can only take place through partnerships or joint ventures (JVs) with the 
state-owned “Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. (MEH).” MEH is part of one of the 
four corporations created to take charge of the exploration, production, and 
commercialization of different groups of minerals and gems in Myanmar (i.e. (1) 
Mining enterprise 1 in charge of non-ferrous metals, (2) Mining enterprise 2 with 
oversight on tin and tungsten metals, (3) Mining enterprise 3 responsible for 
industrial minerals, and (4) MGE responsible for jade and other gems) (Moody, 
1999).  
The allocation of new mining licenses under a JV agreement is carried out 
through a bidding system where prospect buyers must first put down a 100,000-kyat 
deposit (around USD100) and then bid with a starting amount of 1 million kyats 
(USD 1,000) for each plot. For the best areas, the bidding can go up to 55 million 
kyats (USD 55,000) per plot (Rangoon Embassy, 2002). One of the mining 
companies interviewed revealed private companies not entering a JV agreement with 
the government bid with a starting amount of 100 million kyats (USD 10,000).  
Figure 16 shows estimations of the number of blocks licensed for jade mining 
from 2000 until 2001 and from 2005 to 2008. Because the number of licenses 
approved by the government is strictly confidential, only figures for six years could 
be obtained as reference. The gray dotted line denotes the inferred behavior by the 
author.  !
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Figure 16 Mining blocks granted by the government  
[Source: Wu (2000), Wu (2001), Palagems (2012)] 
It is widely acknowledged only those with strong ties to the junta reap the 
benefits of the licenses being offered, meaning license demand is somehow a game 
that only those with the best connections can play. By 2008, more than 450 private 
companies and some 30 joint ventures were reported to be operating in Myanmar’s 
mining sites, the majority of which are owned by Burmese with Chinese heritage 
(Pepper, 2008 ) (AKSYU, 2008 ).  
6.3.1.1. Mining licenses in the model  
In the model, government supply of mining licenses responds to government 
officials’ long-term expectations of high jade prices and therefore to beliefs of high 
profitability. Demand for licenses, though, is eventually constrained by the depletion 
of proven land reserves as reflected by the land utilization fraction. The more the 
licenses granted, the less the land available for mining, and the less the amount of 
licenses that can be offered by the government even in the face of high demand (see 
Figure 17).  
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!
Figure 17 Stock and flow structure for mining licenses 
Assuming a first-order license approval delay of 2 months, licenses approved 
are converted into acres (one mining license is equivalent to one acre of land with 
tenure of five years and the option for a three-year renewal) and begin depleting the 
stock of proven land reserves. Note the stock of land is finite and has been initialized 
at 50,000 acres as explained in section 6.3.2.1. Land beginning to accumulate in the 
stock of acres transferred trigger the “equipment expansion loop” involving the 
purchase of mining equipment and the consequent increase of labor and other 
indirect mining costs. This process will be explained next.  
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Once government officials have approved the mining licenses, the physical 
transfer to mining companies starts. Figure 18 shows this process through a 3-stock 
aging chain of land. One of the most important elements in the diagram is explained 
next.  
Figure 18 Stock and flow structure for land transferring 
6.3.2.1. Initial acres available  
The initial acres available refer to the extension in acres of the jade mining 
tract. Most jade mining sites are located in northern Myanmar, specifically in 
Khamti in the Sagaing division, and in Moe-Nyin, Hpakan, and Namya in the state 
of Kachin (Paung, 2007) (Htwe, 2011). Besides jade and other premium quality gems 
such as rubies and sapphires, Myanmar is also endowed with significant quantities of 
tin, tungsten, lead, antimony, zinc, copper, nickel, iron, wolfram and many other 
minerals (Images Asia & Pan Kachin Development Society, 2004). The arrow 
pointing at the enclosed area on Figure 19 shows the location of most jade deposits 
in Myanmar.  
Although formal estimations on the extension of Myanmar´s jade tract are 
not available, some believe it to be around 200 sqkm or the equivalent to 50,000 
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acres (Htay, 2011) (Jade-Jadeite, 2008). Because each jade mining license is 
equivalent to 1 acre of land, the stock of “acres available” has been initialized at 
50,000 acres. Acres available refer to the total amount of unexploited jade-rich land 
that will eventually be granted to mining companies through mining licenses.  !"#!!"#$#%&!!"#$%!!"!#$!%$& = 50000 ≪ !"#$% ≫!
Sensitivity analysis in later chapters will test the model’s behavior under 
different parameter values for the jade mining extension.!
 
Figure 19 Jade mining area 
 [Source: Fan and Ko (1994)] 
6.3.3. Mine life and equipment requirements  
After acres have been granted to mining companies, the purchase of mining 
equipment follows. Mining equipment selection usually starts by determining the 
optimum sizes of equipment and the number of units required for a given production 
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schedule (Society for Mining Metallurgy & Exploration, 2001). In this model, all 
mining equipment (e.g. excavators, trucks, drilling machines, etc.) will be considered 
as “standard,” meaning no type, model, or serial discriminations will be made at the 
moment of ordering equipment. Although models and serials do matter (i.e. they 
determine the sizes of buckets or benches and therefore equipment productivities per 
load and equipment productivities per shift), it will be simply assumed standard 
mining equipment can process x fraction of an acre per shift instead of a tonnage 
amount per shift. Some of the factors that usually govern the selection of mining 
equipment, and how they were addressed in the model formulation, are described 
below: 
• Mine life: the number of operating years of a mine that guide the 
production plan or schedule for the extraction of jade. In this model, the 
validity period of a mining license defines the production lifespan of a 
particular mining site;  !"#!! "#$!!"#$ = 5 ≪ !"#$% ≫ 
• Mine geometry: the area of the mining site. In this model, the number of 
licenses granted to a mining firm, each equivalent to 1 acre of land, equals 
the area to be mined;  
• Site location: refers either the location of the mining site in relation to the 
dumping site, its location in relation to neighboring sites property of other 
mining companies, or simply the geographical characteristics of the site. In 
this model, site location does not play any role; 
• Topography: the physical features of a particular mining site. Topographic 
details are not included in the model; 
• Total material movement: relates to transporting distances (e.g. from the 
mining site to the dumping site) or the features of the material (e.g. dense 
minerals). In this model, drilling, blasting, loading, or dumping activities, 
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just to mention some, are not considered and therefore total material 
movement is ignored; 
• Work schedule: dictated by the number of shifts per day, the duration of 
each shift, and the scheduled number of working days per year. In the case 
of Myanmar, mining shifts are 3/day with an average duration of 7 hours 
each. Seasonality, specifically the monsoon season, modifies the amount of 
operating hours per month as will be explained in the next section. 
Table 2 shows the calculation used for defining the size of the equipment fleet 
and Figure 20 how such calculation was incorporated in the model: 
Table 2 Calculation for equipment fleet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PERIOD 
TOTAL 
ACRES ACRES/SHIFT REQUIRED SCHEDULED OPERATING  % FLEET  
      SHIFTS  SHIFTS SHIFTS  UTILIZATION   
1 20 0.001 20000 750 27 0.8 33 
2 20 0.001 20000 750 27 0.8 33 
3 20 0.001 20000 750 27 0.8 33 
4 20 0.001 20000 750 27 0.8 33 
5 20 0.001 20000 750 27 0.8 33 
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Figure 20 Stock and flow structure for the purchase of mining equipment 
Mine geometry (e.g.100 acres of land) and mine life (e.g. 5 years) yield the 
scheduled amount of land to be worked within each mining period.  The acres 
scheduled for a particular period are divided by equipment productivities per shift 
(i.e. acres/shift) to calculate the number of shifts required to process the total acres 
assigned to each time period. The multiplication of shifts/day and operating 
days/year (i.e. in this example 3 shifts/day and 250 days/year) results in the total 
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number of scheduled shifts in a year. The division of required shifts and yearly 
scheduled shifts is then calculated to obtain the number of equipment units needed 
to handle the required shifts and achieve the targets set for each mining period. 
Finally, when the equipment utilization rate is below 100%, more units are added to 
the required equipment fleet.  
6.3.3.1. Equipment purchases  
When the desired equipment fleet has been defined, the process of ordering 
equipment starts. The structure in Figure 21 shows incoming orders accumulated in 
a backlog that is only emptied when deliveries are materialized. Note the ordering 
process of supplier firms have not been explicitly modeled as more than finding an 
optimal ordering policy, the purpose of this model is to investigate a particular 
behavior pattern in purchases.  
Figure 21 Stock and flow structure for equipment purchases 
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For simplicity purposes, it is assumed that even when there is lack of product 
availability at UMG, customers switch and will find the equipment elsewhere.  
6.3.4. Jade production 
The stock and flow structure in Figure 22 shows the production process that 
follows after the mining equipment has entered the stock of “customer mining 
equipment.” 
Figure 22 Stock and flow structure for production 
6.3.4.1. Exploitation rate 
Jade production, or the jade exploitation rate, is calculated as the product of 
the effective production capacity and the effect of acres availability on exploitation. 
The latter is a first-order control introduced to reflect miners’ behavior upon the 
exhaustion of the land they own.   !"#!!!"#$%&'('&%)!!"#$ = !"#$!!""#$%&'#!!"#$%&'(#)!!"#"!$%& ∗ !""!!""#$%!!"!!"#$%!!"!#$!%#$#&'!!"!!"#$%&'('&%) 
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The effective production capacity is the product of the equipment utilization 
fraction and the maximum production capacity. The former gets activated through a 
capacity expansion feedback, explained in detail in section 0, in which mining 
companies raise production following positive profitability expectations driven by 
short-term expectations of jade prices.!!"#$!!""#$%&'#!!"#$%&'(#)!!"#"!$%& = !"#$!!"#$%&'()!!"#"$%!"&'!!!"#$%&'( ∗ !"#$! "#!!"#$%&'#(!!"#"!$%& 
Finally, the maximum production capacity is the product of the total 
equipment owned by mining companies and the maximum amount of acres one 
mining equipment unit, say an excavator, can process per year. This last measure 
was calculated from data provided by one of the mining companies. !"#$! "#!!"#$%&'#(!!"!"#$%&= !"#$!!"#$%&'(! "#"#$!!"#$%&!'(∗ !"#$! "#!!"#$%!ℎ!"#$%#!!"#! "#"#$!!"#$%&!'(!!"#!!"#$ !"#$! "#!!"#$%!ℎ!"#$%#!!"#! "#"#$!!"#$%&!'(!!"#! !"#ℎ = 0.1 ≪ !"#$%!"#$ ≫!
6.3.4.2. The monsoon and jade production 
One cannot refer to jade production in Myanmar without mentioning the 
effect of the monsoon on yearly mining operations. 
6.3.4.2.1. Monsoon 
Harsh climate conditions in Myanmar, namely the wet monsoon, make mining 
sites almost inaccessible about one third of the year. The wet monsoon is a seasonal 
prevailing wind in the region of South and Southeast Asia mostly characterized by 
heavy rains between May and September. Whereas during the dry season mining 
operations run 7 days/week an average of 20 hours/day, when the wet monsoon 
season arrives fully in June, mining activities must cease entirely as shafts are 
completely filled by water (Ehrmann, 1957).  
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Mining operations start gradually dropping in April, as rain intensity is still 
manageable by then. From June to August rainfall is at its highest and works drop 
to zero. Throughout September, mining activities have not yet fully recovered since 
mines now need to be dewatered.  
!
Figure 23 Average monthly rainfall in Myanmar from 1960 to 1990  
[Source: The World Bank (2012a)] 
Figure 23 shows in a bar graph mean monthly precipitation values in mm 
from 1960 to 1990 with an indicator on top displaying mining intensity percentages 
throughout the year. To prevent the noise, seasonality has been incorporated in the 
model as if operations would run 8 out of 12 months in a year when a seasonality 
switch is operating.  
Figure 24 Seasonality in the model 
SWITCH 
Seasonality
PROD 
Working months per year
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6.3.4.3. Effective tons per acre  
“Miners were asked how often they find jade. They said it 
depends on luck. While in some days they might find up to 25 pieces, 
other times they might go for days without anything. In terms of size, 
some boulders are 200–300kg, some even as big as a but most are less 
than 1kg” 
   Hughes, Galibert, Smith, and Oo (1997) 
When asked how many tons of jade could be found in one acre of land all 
interviewees coincided with the quote above in that it is all about luck. Luck plays 
such a big role among Myanmar’s people that purchases of mining equipment are 
often materialized quicker when the buyer’s lucky number matches that of the 
equipment’s serial number, sales officers at UMG report. A closer look at production 
data from one of the mining companies revealed the tonnage per acre of land can 
range from1 up to 24 tons/acre. The constant used for the simulation model has 
been set as the mean of both limits.  !"#$!!"#$!!"#!!"#$ = 12 << !"#$!"#$ ≫!
6.3.5. Jade extracted, jade in warehouses, and jade for sale 
The jade aging chain shown in Figure 25 emulates the physical flow of jade 
being taken out from reserves, being classified, being stored, and finally being sold.  
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Figure 25 Jade aging chain 
6.3.5.1. Jade reserves 
“I am not geologist. I think even expert geologists cannot know. 
Only God can know this.” 
           A.M.H. UMG branch manager  
Whereas estimations for Chinese nephrite jade reserves can be easily accessed 
(Jade-Jadeite, 2008), proven reserves for jadeite jade in Myanmar remain unknown. 
Part of the explanation resides in the fact that the government relies on antiquated 
geological data, much of it prepared by geologists who have now fled the country, or 
on data which may not have been efficiently updated (Moody, 1999). Even when 
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hypothetically reliable information on the state of jade reserves might exist, this is a 
sensitive governmental issue and hence subject to a high degree of secrecy. The 
initial value for the stock of jade reserves in the model is determined by the 
multiplication of the initial value for the stock of acres available and the constant 
tons per acre.  !"#!!"#$!!"#"!$"#= !"#!!"#$#%&!!"#$%!!"!#!"#!$ ∗ !"#$!Effective!!!"#$!!"#!!"#$ 
6.3.5.2. Jade extracted and jade in warehouses 
After being extracted from its host rock, jade stones undergo a special process 
before they are put out to sale (see Figure 26).  
Figure 26 Jade from its extraction to its sales phase 
Except for big jade pieces, which are easily identifiable, stone “finders” or 
“pickers” are first in charge of separating jade from the rest of the sediment product 
of the extraction process. Big stones are then carefully cut into more manageable 
pieces, polished if necessary, and finally stored for their subsequent sale  
In the model, the “jade extracted” stock is fed by the jade production rate 
and drained by two outflows, namely (a) the jade dilution rate, and (b) the jade 
transportation rate.  These two outflows are a representation of a selection process 
whereby waste material is separated from the valuable one by means of the “dilution 
fraction.” Although the average dilution fraction in open-pit mining is an average of 
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5% (Camm, 2010), in the model it is set at 20% of the total production in one year 
following the experience of the mining companies interviewed. !!"#! "##$%"&'!!"#$%&'( = 0.2 ≪ 1!"#$ ≫ 
The jade dilution rate is given by the product of the stock of jade extracted 
and the dilution fraction, meant to encompasses both “external dilution” (i.e. low-
grade material taken unintentionally during extraction) and “internal dilution” (i.e. 
waste material so ingrained within the ore that physical separation is unfeasible) 
(Pincock Perspectives, 2004). !"#!!"#$!!"#$%"&'!!"#$ = !"#!!"#$!!"#$%&#!' ∗ !"#! "#$%"&'!!"#$%&'(!
On the other hand, the jade transportation rate represents the amount of gem 
ore actually recovered from a jade deposit. In this case the rate is given by the 
multiplication of the stock of jade extracted and the “recovery fraction” or simply 1 
minus the dilution fraction. !"#!!"#$!!"#$%&'"!#!('$!!"#$ = !"#!!"#$!!"#$%&#!' ∗ (1− !"#! "#$%!"#!!"#$%&'() 
6.3.5.3. Jade sales  
Although sales of Myanmar’s jade take place through legal and illegal 
channels, this model assumes there is only one rate of sales, one that is basically 
derived from the information about government gem auctions. Before describing the 
stock and flow structure for the demand side, an introduction on gem auctions is 
first provided.  
6.3.5.3.1. Auctions  
Held three times per year, government controlled “jade emporium shows” are 
one of the existing channels for jade sales and an important source of foreign 
currency to the junta. The annual sale of jade, rubies, sapphires, and pearl lots 
began in 1962,with a mid-year sale edition being introduced in 1992, and a third 
special edition in 2004 (AKSYU, 2008 )
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March of every year, mid-year auctions are held each October or November, and 
special editions in July or August. Appendix 3 shows statistics related to the 
different gem emporium editions that have taken place since 2003.  
During each emporium show, jade is showcased in “lots” (i.e. boulders of raw 
jade of similar quality) and purchased mainly by Chinese buyers. Depending on the 
quality, each jade lot offered through a competitive bidding system has a different 
reserve or floor price that can range from USD 2,000 to USD 100,000 or even more. 
In the case of JVs, a 50% government tax on each emporium transaction is levied on 
mining companies. According to the miners, one of the benefits of the auctions, 
besides its legality and sometimes higher profitability when compared to illegal sales 
of jade along the Chinese and Thai borders, is that foreign exchange profits from 
these sales are "white" and thus can be used for other transactions (Rangoon 
Embassy, 2002). 
6.3.5.3.2. Jade sales rate  
Chinese consumers account for the majority of foreign visitors to the 
emporium show each year (see Appendix 3). For the Chinese, by far the world’s 
greatest jade connoisseurs and consumers, jade has a legendary and very special 
meaning. According to traditional Chinese culture jade is able to bring happiness 
and luck to one’s live and to keep the evil away. Jade has been valued in China even 
more than gold and silver in the Western world (Telenko, 2001).  
With the rise of the Chinese economy and the awaken desire for luxury items, 
jade has not only become the continuation of a cultural phenomenon that dates from 
long ago, but also an investment vehicle for many people. Because, as opposed to 
real state for example, jade does not need to be registered and it is therefore non-
traceable, it has become an attractive storage of value for many.  
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In the model, the jade sales rate is determined by two stocks: (a) population 
of consumers, and (b) per-capita consumption (see Figure 27).  
Figure 27 Stock and flow structure for jade sales 
6.3.5.3.2.1. Population of consumers 
Estimations for this variable are based on yearly figures of visitors to the gem 
emporiums displayed in Appendix 3. Note the author built approximations for the 
number of visitors during the period 2000-2002, as this information could not be 
found.  
Table 3 shows the number of foreign visitors per auction, the total number of 
visitors per year (i.e. the product of 3 auctions per year and the number of visitors 
per auction), and finally a normalized number of yearly visitors. Foreign visitors for 
each emporium sale, 90% of which are usually Chinese, have risen since 2000 
consistent with the increased purchasing power of Chinese citizens. The drop 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
PER 
AUCTION 162 243 364 546 600 765 1000 2189 3000 2433 3500 3773 3000 
PER YEAR 485 728 1092 1638 1800 2294 3000 6568 9000 7300 10500 11319 9000 
NORMALIZED  1618 2427 3640 5460 6000 7645 10000 21893 30000 24333 35000 37730 30000 
evidenced in 2009 is attributed to the effects of the global financial crisis on China’s 
economy. 
Normalized values for visitors suggest that besides buyers at auctions, buyers 
from illegal border trade also exist. It is assumed the former represent about 30% of 
total jade buyers.  The stock of population of consumers growths after a fractional 
growth rate multiplies the stock when a switch parameter is activated.  
Table 3 Population of consumers 
6.3.5.3.2.2. Per-capita requirements  
The per-capita consumption stock is modeled as a first-order exponential 
smoothing with a 4-month adjustment delay to better reflect the gradual adjustment 
of consumers’ demand to a change in price. Any value of per-capita requirements is 
defined by the graph function “equilibrium per-capita consumption” which is in turn 
a function of the “effective jade price per ton.”  
Table 4 presents the empirical numerical relationship between per-capita 
consumption (i.e. per-cap C) and the price of jade per ton (i.e. price) in Myanmar’s 
market. The former results from the division between the normalized consumption 
rate (i.e. norm C), or the sum of all jade tons that were sold at each auction 
multiplied by the number of auctions/year, and the normalized population of 
consumers (i.e. norm P) introduced in Table 3. Note total consumption is also 
normalized to suggest the consumption of jade during each emporium show is 
estimated to be an average of 30% of the total consumption. 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
C 439 615 861 426 1483 2029 3515 5935 8085 6899 12104 18529 14643 
NORM C 1464 2050 2878 1418 4943 6765 11718 19783 26950 22995 40345 61762 48810 
PRICE 94472 31707 58072 36036 23602 37943 64289 62342 40569 45155 159954 151119 N/A 
NORM P 1618 2427 3640 5460 6000 7645 10000 21893 30000 24333 35000 37730 30000 
PER-CAP C 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.82 0.88 1.17 0.90 0.90 0.95 1.15 1.64 1.63 
 
Table 4 Per-capita consumption requirements and price 
Bolded rows in  
Table 4 highlight time-series data on jade prices per ton and per-capita 
requirements. All coordinates from this table have been plotted in  
Figure 28 to show the jade demand function is the opposite of the downward 
slope curve of traditional demand in which substitution allows demand to decrease 
when the price of a good increases.  
Figure 28 Empirical relationship of per-capita requirements and jade prices 
In fact, when the demand of goods like jewelry, diamonds, and gems increase 
with increases in price, they are classified as articles of distinction or Veblen goods. 
According to Thorstein Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption, individuals 
emulate the consumption patterns of other individuals situated at higher points in 
the hierarchy to increase their status (Trigg, 2001). The jade demand function has 
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been shown to be one in which consumers’ preference for buying it increases with 
increases in price.  
6.3.5.4. Inventory coverage and jade prices  
The upcoming subsections will describe how changes in jade inventories, affect 
inventory coverage, and how changes in inventory coverage feedback to jade prices.  
Figure 29 Stock and flow structure for inventory coverage and price 
6.3.5.4.1. Inventory coverage  
The desired holding stock for mining companies has been set at 4 months or 
the equivalent to the accumulated production for one emporium show. The jade in 
warehouses stock is divided by the expected sales rate, modeled as a first order 
smoothing with a 3-month delay, to calculate the actual inventory coverage in 
months. This actual is then compared to the desired coverage of 4 months to obtain 
the relative inventory coverage that will drive the price of jade per ton. Empirical 
evidence for the calculation of the relationship between inventory coverage and price 
is shown in Table 5. 
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2000  11,096   439   1,464  7.6 0.3 22.7  94,472  
2001  8,174   615   2,050  4.0 0.3 12.0  31,707  
2002  10,879   861   2,870  3.8 0.3 11.4  58,072  
2003  10,755   426   1,418  7.6 0.3 22.7  36,036  
2004  14,988   1,483   4,943  3.0 0.3 9.1  23,602  
2005  20,390   2,029   6,765  3.0 0.3 9.0  37,943  
2006  20,458   3,515   11,718  1.7 0.3 5.2  64,289  
2007  20,235   5,935   19,783  1.0 0.3 3.1  62,342  
2008  32,921   8,085   26,950  1.2 0.3 3.7  40,569  
2009  25,795   6,899   22,995  1.1 0.3 3.4  45,155  
2010  46,810   12,104   40,345  1.2 0.3 3.5  159,954  
2011  70,000   18,529   61,762  1.1 0.3 3.4  151,119  
2012  55,000   14,643   48,810  1.1 0.3 3.4  N/A  
 
 
Table 5 Relative inventory coverage and price 
Some of the coordinates for relative inventory coverage and price are shown in 
Figure 30.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 Empirical relationship between relative inventory coverage and 
price 
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GREEN LAVANDER  OTHERS 
EXTRA FINE GREEN  FINE LAVANDER  RED  
FINE GREEN  GOOD LAVANDER  YELLOW  
GOOD GREEN  COMMERCIAL LAVANDER  WHITE  
COMMERCIAL GREEN    GREY  
 
The curve reveals prices increase with decreases in inventory coverage and 
vice versa. Although it is true that jade prices vary among producers, processors, 
distributors, and retailers, this model presents only one price under the assumption 
that where there are more than a few competitors, the prices at different levels are 
generally correlated (Meadows, 1970). 
6.3.5.4.2. Introduction to jade prices 
Particular characteristics, namely “hue” (i.e. the position on the color wheel), 
“saturation” (i.e. intensity of color), and “tone” (i.e. lightness or darkness), 
determine the quality and consequently the price of jade (Hughes, et al., 2000) 
(Roskin, 2000). Besides offering a comprehensive review of the history and chemical 
characteristics of jade, Howard (2002) presents a color and quality classification that 
serves as a starting point at understanding the complexity involved in appraising 
both raw and processed jade (see Table 6). 
 
 
Table 6 Jade colors and qualities 
Colors not only determine quality but also have a special spiritual meaning 
among jade’s biggest consumers: the Chinese. The value of a jade piece can 
dramatically decrease, for instance, when even a slight combination of lavander (i.e. 
“Chuan”) and green (i.e. “Chi”) color is encountered in the same jade boulder. The 
Chinese consider the color of jade as their energy or “Chi” and therefore the 
intensity of green in the stone is supremely important. In the presence of a mix, 
“Chuan” is believed to destroy the liveliness of “Chi” and therefore kill the spirit of 
jade consequently lowering the value of the stone (Naturaljade, 2007). 
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6.3.5.4.2.1. A note on empirical findings 
Two emporium booklets provided by one of the mining firms allowed the 
calculation of average percentages for different jade qualities from a 4-month 
production period, which represents the accumulated production prior to each 
emporium show. Each booklet contained a picture, reserve price, sales price, and 
weight of each jade lot sold by this particular mining company during the emporium 
shows of October 2010 and July 2011.  Additionally, the sales department at UMG 
was in possession of one complete government booklet, bought for around USD 700, 
that listed 7784 jade lots with their corresponding owner’s name, buyer’s name, 
weight, number of pieces, and finally the lot’s sales price. Complete emporium 
reports are not only expensive but also difficult to obtain even when the interested 
party has the financial means to acquire them. The three booklets hereby mentioned 
were therefore the only ones used for analyzing the quality composition of jade lots 
in a 4-month jade mining period.   
One can differentiate among four different categories of jade qualities: 
A=exceptional or extra fine, B=very good, C=good or commercial, and D=fair 
(Howard, 2002). One of the mining firms was instrumental in validating the realism 
of these four categories, which are based on reserve prices and the number pieces per 
lot. The latter represents a criterion for categorization since in the case of a lot 
offered at USD 100,000, for instance, the reserve price might have been calculated 
based on quality (e.g. one big jade stone of superior quality) or number of pieces 
(e.g. twenty five small stones of medium quality). Results from the analysis showed 
around 3 % of the production is quality A with a reserve price of USD 100,000 or 
higher, another 7% is jade quality B with a reserve price between USD 50,000 and 
USD 100,000, 20% jade quality C with reserve prices ranging between USD 10,000 
and USD 50,000, and finally 70% jade quality D showing reserve prices lower than 
USD 10,000.  
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YEAR  EMPORIUM  EMPORIUM  PRICE*** 
  REVENUES* C IN 
TONS**    
2000 41.5 439  94,472  
2001 19.5 615  31,707  
2002 50.0 861  58,072  
2003 23.0 426  54,054  
2004 35.0 1483  23,602  
2005 77.0 2029  37,943  
2006 226.0 3515  64,289  
2007 370.0 5935  62,342  
2008 328.0 8085  40,569  
2009 311.5 6899  45,155  
2010 1936.0 12104  159,954  
2011 2800.0 18529  151,119  
2012 N/A 14643  N/A  
6.3.5.4.3. Prices in the jade model  
“So as far as I’m aware, there’s no such thing as a “jade index,” 
just a more general impression of where the market stands.” 
(Chovanec, 2011) 
Different from ore, which has a fairly objective price based on weight and 
purity, it is now clear that every piece of jade is unique. Despite widespread concerns 
on the impossibility to determine the price of jade, this model introduces an attempt 
to do so by using aggregate data from gem emporium revenues and emporium sales 
transactions. Table 7 shows the average jade price per ton since 2000 until 2011 
results from the division between total emporium revenues in USD millions and total 
emporium consumption in tons.  
Table 7 Emporium revenues, emporium sales, and estimated jade price  
[Source*: (Palagems, 2012) (Egreteau, 2011); Source**: see Appendix 3; 
Source***: calculated by the author] 
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  JADE LOTS SHOWCASED AVG WEIGHT PER LOT (KG) 
SAMPLE GOVERNMENT  560 617 
MINING COMPANY ES1 84 476 
MINING COMPANY ES2 147 398 
  AVG 497 
 
Emporium revenues are calculated as the sum of revenues from the 3 annual 
emporium shows described in section 6.3.5.3.1. Likewise, emporium sales in tons are 
calculated as the sum of all jade lots sold at the 3 annual emporium shows. Lots 
were converted into tons by estimating the average weight of each jade lot displayed 
at each of the emporium shows. This last measure was obtained by relying on 560 
observations from the government sales booklet (about 8% of the universe), and 
complete data on lots from the two emporium booklets (i.e. “ES1” and “ES2”) 
provided by one of the mining companies. Results suggest that independently of the 
number of pieces per lot, each jade lot weights approximate 500 kg or the equivalent 
to 0.5 tons (see Table 8). 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Estimation of weight in tons per jade lot 
Figure 31 portraits the approximate evolution of jade prices since 2000 until 
2011. As previously explained, the difficulty in stating an average selling price for 
raw jade arises from the many different combinations of features a certain piece can 
exhibit like color, cut, clarity, cracks, transparency, texture, and volume (Quimei, 
2003). The green curve on the graph sketches the behavior described by most of the 
interviewees when asked about jade prices. Most agreed prices in 2010 increased at 
least four fold when compared to those in 2001. Although not accurately, Figure 31 
seems to fit this description.  
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Figure 31 Jadeite prices per ton 
6.3.6. Capacity utilization in the extraction phase  
Exploitation or extraction is associated with the recovery of minerals from the 
earth. Once the mine is operating though, there are times when the mining firm 
decides to boost or slow down extraction. Differences in extraction choices are based 
on the relationship between price and operating costs. When the gap between the 
two is positive, there is an incentive to increase production using current resources 
and even expand it through the acquisition of more mining sites after some time. 
Conversely, when the gap is negative, more often as a result of a low price, 
production is discouraged and hence slowed down.  
The function of capacity utilization in the model is given by the following 
relationship:  !"#!!"#$%&$'! "#$%& = !"#!!!"#$%&$'!!"#$%!!ℎ!"#!!"#/!"#!!"#$%&$'!!"#$!!"#$"%&'!!"#$#!
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Where the expected price in the short run is modeled as a first order 
smoothing with a 1 month delay, and the expected variable cost is also modeled as 
expectations formations of the unit variable cost of production (see Figure 32). 
Figure 32 Stock and flow structure for capacity utilization 
Different expected markup values feed the non-linear function that determines 
the multiplier of the actual production capacity. The graph function is one in which 
only few producers increase production in the advent of small positive markups and 
a more significant number fuels production further in the presence of greater positive 
markups. The upper boundary for the production multiplier has been set at 1.20 
taking into account mining companies can only increase their daily schedules from 20 
to 24 hours.  
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6.3.7. Financials  
A financial sector has been included in the model to track the financial 
performance of the mining industry in an aggregate manner (see Figure 33).  
Figure 33 Stock and flow structure for the financial sector!
Financial revenues are modeled as the product of jade sales and the effective 
jade price per ton while after-tax profits as the product of revenues and the 
emporium government tax set at 0.4. !"#!!"#"$%"&!!"#$!!"#$!!"#$!= !"#!!!"#!!"#$!!!"#$ ∗!"#!!""#$%&'#!!"#$!!"#$%!!"#!!"# 
Two types of payments feed the stock of cash, mostly in accordance with the 
payment delays involved in emporium transactions. Miners pointed out a down 
payment is first made after the sale transaction is completed or within a maximum 
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of 2 months, and a second and final payment is made after 5 months of the actual 
sale.  !"#!!"#$%&'(!!"#$%!!"#$%&'()$* = 1 ≪ !"#$ℎ ≫!!"#!!"#$%&'(!!"#$!!!"#$%&!!"#$ = 5 ≪ !"#$ℎ! ≫ 
Expenses incurred during the mining operations represent the outflows from 
the cash stock. Such disbursements are in accordance with the expense categories 
listed in the discounted cash flow analysis in section 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !
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Chapter 7. Model behavior and analysis  
7.1. Base case  
Figure 34 displays the results of the base or “business as usual” run.  
Simulation results from different variables have been placed from left to right 
following a logical sequence starting with mining licenses.  First note that at the 
beginning of the simulation, an increasing number of jade mining licenses granted 
allow the gradual escalation of acres transferred to mining companies, mining 
equipment orders, and jade production. As more land is given away, less remains 
available for further extraction, thus activating the balancing loop 1 described in 
detail in section 5.3.2. Through the land utilization fraction, licenses are gradually 
diminished as a result of “land crowding” even though the trend for mining licensing 
is going upwards (see the first 2 graphs in Figure 34). Assuming the non-linear 
function constraining the licenses is close to reality, the turning point in decreasing 
equipment orders and jade production lies around this year. Note the oscillations in 
both variables continue in a downward fashion given the decreasing amount of land 
left and therefore the less amount of land that can be granted to mining companies 
for jade extraction. In the base case, the final value of jade reserves is about 8% of 
the reserves at the beginning of the simulation.   
Rows 3 and 4 from Figure 34 show the effects of production and inventory 
coverage on capacity utilization and jade supply. Although jade in production 
increases from the start of the simulation until 2011 or 2012, jade at warehouses is 
depleted during this period as a result of an equally high per-capita consumption. 
High consumption drains jade inventories so as to make the price of jade increase 
and foster greater consumption. The reinforcing loop 1, whereby higher prices trigger 
higher consumption, is at some point overwhelmed by an even higher increase in 
production that causes a price drops and makes consumption go down again. 
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Consumption is kept relatively low until a drop in production, resulting from the 
land depletion loop B1, causes inventories to drop and not be able to cope with 
demand. A drop in production and inventory coverage causes price and therefore 
consumption increases. 
 
Figure 34 Base run simulation results 
Regarding the supply side, capacity expansion is observed in the escalating 
amount of licenses granted as a result of high prices and the linked expectations of 
high future profitability. Finally, one of the minor model loops, the capacity 
utilization loop B4, is also operating by acting as a multiplier of current equipment 
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productivity when beliefs of short-term profitability are present. The effect of 
markup on capacity utilization can be seen in the graph before the last one in Figure 
34. 
7.2. Model validation 
Validation is the process by which the correspondence between the model 
system and the real system is systematically enhanced (Schwaninger & Groesser, 
2009). Although different views on model validation exist, there seems to be the 
general consensus that, as advocated by Forrester and Senge (1980), there is no 
single test which serves to “validate” a system dynamics model, but rather only to 
build a gradual confidence on it. The process of model validation has then been 
described as iterative, gradual, semiformal, and conversational (Barlas, 1996), and 
one that is highly connected to the purpose of each particular model.  
7.2.1. Behavior reproduction test 
The behavior reproduction test employs formal measures of “goodness-of-fit” 
to test the correspondence of model behavior with historical data. Because formal 
data at the industry-level is scarce for most of the major variables included in the 
model, only those variables backed up by time-series datasets have been subjected to 
this test.  
After discussing why most used summary statistical measures to evaluate 
goodness-of-fit in econometric models (i.e. R2) do not serve their purpose for system 
dynamic models, Sterman (1984) proposes the use of (a) the mean square error 
(MSE), (b) the root mean square percent error (RMSPE), and (c) Theil statistics as 
measures of total error, normalized magnitude of the error, and a fractional 
decomposition of the error, respectively. Formulas for the each element are presented 
below:  
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!"# = 1! (!! − !!)!!!!!  
!"#$% = 1! (!! − !!)!!!!!!
!
 
Where ! equals the total number of observations, St the simulated value at 
time t, and At the actual or reference value at time t.  
Theil statistics yield three fractions that add to 100% of the MSE and that 
capture (a) bias (UM), (b) unequal variation (UV), and (c) unequal covariance (UC). 
!! = ! − ! !1! ! !! − !! ! 
 
!! = !! − !! !1! !! − !! ! 
 
!! = 2 1− ! !!!!1! !! − !! ! 
 
 Where ! and ! are the means of simulated (S) and actual values (A), !!  and !!  the standard deviations of S and A, and !  the correlation coefficient 
between S and A.  
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Table 9 MSE and Theil statistics for 3 selected variables 
Table 9 shows how the mean square error and inequality statistics have been 
used to evaluate the fit to historical data of (a) jade production, (b) yearly 
equipment sales of UMG, and (c) accumulated sales or the total machine population 
of UMG. Starting the model in 2000 provides exactly 11 years of simulated data to 
compare against the real behavior of the jade industry. Note how the RMSPEs for 
all three variables are below 10% with the highest error of almost 7% corresponding 
to the sales rate. These results show the model adequately tracks all major system 
variables with a great deal of accuracy.  
Below, quick descriptions expand on the statistical results for each of the 
three variables and graphs display a comparison between simulated and real data. In 
all graphs, black lines denote reference times-series whereas green lines are used for 
simulation results. Complementary variables, if necessary, are presented in red.  
7.2.1.1. Simulated and actual jade production 
Simulated and actual values for jade production are shown in Figure 35. 
  ROOT MEAN 
SQUARE 
PERCENT 
ERROR 
RMSPE  
MEAN 
SQUARE 
ERROR 
(MSE)  
INEQUALITY STATISTICS 
 U
M US UC 
VARIABLE  (%) (UNITS 2) (FRACTION OG MSE) 
PROD JADE PRODUCTION IN TONS       
(TONS/YEAR)  1.24% 3.5E+06 0.003 0.076 0.921 
PROD SALES RATE UMG      
(EQUIPMENT/YEAR)  6.89% 5.8E+03 0.010 0.150 0.840 
PROD ACCUMULATED SALES UMG      
(EQUIPMENT)  4.63% 9.1E+04 0.393 0.517 0.090 
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In accordance to real jade production, simulated results show periods of 3 
years in an upwardly increasing trend. The error decomposition for this variable 
indicates less than 1% is attributed to bias, around 7% to unequal variation, and the 
vast majority (i.e. 92%) to unequal covariation, suggesting simulated production 
follows actual production almost perfectly in periods and amplitudes, but diverges 
point by point. In fact, most differences are noticeable at the beginning of the 
simulation and in the peak lying between 2006 and 2008. In spite of the small 
difference, results prove satisfactory and do not compromise by any means the 
validity of this study. 
Figure 35 Simulated and actual jade production 
7.2.1.2. Simulated and actual purchases to UMG 
Figure 36 displays both simulated and actual results for mining equipment 
purchases to UMG, or sales of UMG, on a year-to-year basis. As in the actual 
situation, purchases of equipment in the simulation oscillate every 3 years and seem 
to grow from peak to peak.  
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Figure 36 Simulated and actual equipment purchases to UMG 
Because most variables in the model are at the industry level, purchases of 
mining equipment are reported as if the entire conglomerate of mining companies 
would purchase mining equipment from the entire group of equipment suppliers in 
Myanmar. Therefore, in order to derive UMG’s yearly sales, a measure of market 
share was incorporated in the model as follows: !"#$! "#$"!!"#$! "# = !"#$! "#$"!!"#$! "#$%& ∗ !"#$%&'()*!!ℎ!"#! "#!
Where,  !"#$! "#$%&!!ℎ!"#! "#= !"#$(0.05,2000)+ !"#$(0.05,2003)+ !"#$(0.16,2006.5)!
The market share fraction was first tested as a constant parameter of around 
30%, but was later on adjusted to better emulate the real evolution of UMG market 
share over time. Hence, the market share fraction is set at 5% at the beginning of the 
simulation, increased by 5% in 2003, and finally increased by 16% in 2006 to reach a 
final total market share of about 25%. It is important to highlight UMG believes its 
market share to be around 50% today, and completely supports the existence of an 
evolutionary rather than linear and constant market share path since the company 
inception in 1998. Although simulation results certainly followed the actual behavior 
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mode of this variable at first, the introduction of a STEP function was necessary to 
explicitly reflect market share changes for the client firm.  
It is crucial to gave in mind that UMG equipment sales do not interact with 
the rest of the model per se but were rather calculated to report on the variable 
under study and check its fit with real-life observations. In practice, aggregated total 
equipment purchases is what, along with productivities per equipment, determines 
the total jade production in the model.  
As in the previous case, Theil statistics show most of the 6.89% error between 
simulated and reference sales can be attributed to point-to-point mismatches and not 
bias or unequal variations.  
7.2.1.3. UMG and its competitors  
Inter and intra-departmental discussions at UMG are generally centered on 
ensuring customer satisfaction though quality products, reliable processes, and 
speedy service (UMG Groups, 2012). Being the best implies no sale opportunity is 
lost, no customer relationship already gained is destroyed, and market share is 
always increasing. Market share figures are always a guess since not only estimates of 
total equipment requirements at the industry level are unknown, but also other 
measures to derive these estimates, such as the number of licenses granted, are 
subject to governmental secrecy. Given the pervasive uncertainty, the model serves 
as an appropriate tool to generate industry sales and graphically see the share of the 
market being taken by competitor firms in Myanmar.  
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Figure 37 shows this assertion by plotting simulated market sales parallel to 
sales for UMG. The existing gap throughout the reference period shows the amount 
of sales taken by competitor firms that in theory UMG could have taken advantage 
of.  
Figure 37 Simulated market sales vs. simulated UMG sales 
7.2.1.4. Simulated and actual accumulated sales  
Although a measure of accumulated sales might seem unnecessary, as it is 
simply an accumulation of the sales rate, to UMG the evolution of yearly sales is as 
important as the accumulated equipment sales. The “machine population,” as UMG 
calls it, is an essential measure of the quantity of machines in operation technical 
personnel must provide support to. Technical support activities include, but are not 
restricted to, equipment repairs, equipment periodical maintenance checks, and 
changes in equipment spare parts when mandated by equipment manufacturers. 
Knowing the total number of sold machines serves also as a basis for UMG to plan 
ahead the number of mechanics that must trained (i.e. the complete mechanic 
development program at UMG lasts about 3 years) or the number of spare parts 
they must order to support potential customer needs (i.e. imports of spare parts take 
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an average of 5 months). It is within this context that accumulated UMG sales are 
also calculated in the model. 
Figure 38 shows reference and simulated time-series for accumulated UMG 
sales. Again, looking at the compositions of the mean square error, 39% of the error 
shows up as bias and 51% as unequal variation. A large bias error is an indicator of 
systematic error in the presence of an equally large total error as reflected by the 
MSE, which in this case reaches only 4.63%. If an error is systematic, even if it is 
large, “it may still be acceptable provided it does not compromise the purpose of the 
model” (Stephan, 1992). In this case, nor the MSE is critically large, nor the purpose 
of the model is compromised by the results of this “indicator,” meaning the 
significance of a mildly large bias error is not worrying.  
Figure 38 Simulated vs. actual accumulated UMG sales 
The variance proportion !!, equaling 51% for this variable, is a measure of 
how well simulated results match the degree of variability found in real values. In 
the case of accumulated sales, simulation results follow the rising trend of the real 
machine population (as expected from a stock with a single inflow), though they fail 
to follow the magnitude of actual values from 2006 onwards.  A cause for this might 
be the arbitrary STEP fraction introduced in the rate that feeds this stock of 
accumulated sales (refer to Figure 36 again). As in the case of the sales rate though, 
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results of accumulated sales are not compromised given its small total error and its 
use in the model as only an indicator.  
7.2.2. Scenario analysis  
This section presents the effects of two scenarios, run in parallel and 
combined, on critical model variables, namely (a) market sales rate of mining 
equipment, (b) jade production, (c) jade reserves, and (d) jade price per ton. Mining 
licensing and jade consumption have been chosen as inputs for the scenario analysis 
given they stand as the most relevant sources of uncertainty among UMG managers. 
The following lines briefly list the most common features of scenarios, as identified 
by Zhu, Bai, Xu, and Zhu (2011), and their correspondence with this study:  
• Scenarios describe processes in a broad time scale: two sets of scenarios or 
alternative possible futures will be incorporated to the simulation model 
starting at 2012 and run throughout the rest of the simulation interval.  
• Scenarios are internally consistent and plausible alternative projections: in 
the case of mining licenses, both lower and upper boundary scenarios can 
be considered realistic at this point in time. Given the drastic turnaround 
of Myanmar politics and laws, either the booming in mining licenses 
(following the opening of Myanmar’s mining sector to foreign investment) 
as well as the decrease in mining licensing (upon reactions from the 
international community about Myanmar’s environmental and human 
rights violations in the mine sites) are possible. In regards to tonnage per 
acre, chances are the best quality reserves have been depleted already or 
vice versa. How much jade can be found still remains a guess among 
producers and traders. This uncertainty, however, does not prevent the 
model form being tested under different hypothetical situations.   
• Scenario methods are uncertainty based both internal and external: as 
pointed out in the introductory paragraph of this section, the amount of 
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jade mining licenses granted by government officials, as well as the 
consumption trends of Chinese consumers, are among the two biggest 
uncertainties decision makers at UMG face. These two prevent sales 
managers from making accurate predictions of how the market will behave 
and therefore how big their growth prospects in orders of equipment 
should be.  
7.2.2.1. Mining licenses  
Figure 39 shows how the reference mining license curve was adapted, through 
the use of different multipliers, to represent each scenario input.  
 
Figure 39 Paths in mining licensing 
Table 10 displays a description of the first set of assumptions about the future 
of mining licenses tested in the model. Mining licenses in Myanmar are subject to 
government control and have therefore always been an “unknown” given for the 
different players in the industry. All three proposed situations are adjusted to 
represent a continuation (i.e. base case), an increase (i.e. mining rush), or a decrease 
(i.e. responsible mining) in the actual license-granting trend.  
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Table 10 Scenarios for mining licenses 
7.2.2.1.1. Results  
Results from the three different scenarios in mining licenses on the five chosen 
output variables are displayed in Table 11 and Figure 40. 
Table 11 Results from scenarios in mining licenses 
MINING LICENSES 
SCENARIOS  DESCRIPTION  
MULTIPLIERS (AS A 
FRACTION OF BASELINE 
VALUE)  
BASE CASE  CONTINUATION OF PREVIOUS LICENSING TREND  1 
MINING RUSH  INCREASE IN THE DESIRED LICENSING DUE TO THE INFLUX OF 
FOREING INVESTMENT IN MINING  3 
RESPONSIBLE MINING  DECREASE IN THE DESIRED LINCENSING DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND SOCIAL CONCERNS  0.3 
 
  BASE CASE  MINING RUSH  RESPONSIBLE MINING  
  2015 2018 2021 2015 2018 2021 2015 2018 2021 
ORDER RATE 3,520 3,204 2,829 5,046 3,416 2,566 2,398 2,244 2,180 
JADE PRODUCTION 25,349 18,403 12,000 37,113 11,240 2,790 10,131 10,345 10,413 
JADE RESERVES 171,579 105,237 57,292 81,011 14,853 737 219,912 189,369 156,599 
PRICE PER TON 103,245 102,512 103,785 97,305 122,366 144,046 124,043 100,099 91,732 
MACHNINE POPUL.  15,935 16,304 15,708 20,252 19,841 17,247 13,612 12,650 11,970 
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 Figure 40 Results from scenarios in mining licenses II 
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For UMG, the most favorable scenario seems to be the one in which 
responsible mining prompts government authorities in Myanmar to slow down license 
granting for jade mining. Although orders or mining equipment (at the market level) 
are slightly less in scenario 3 than in the base case scenario or scenario 2, remaining 
reserves at the end of the simulation in scenario 3 make a difference in the future.   
Note how in the first 2 scenarios, jade reserves are exhausted quickly and even 
get depleted in face of the “mining rush” scenario. When less licenses than usual are 
granted, the market keeps needing equipment for a longer time period, and the fact 
that reserves are not exhausted as quick, implies the sustainability or survival of 
UMG as a firm is not compromised as quick. In scenario 2, notice also how, in 
contrast to scenarios 1 and 3, jade production peeks once again around 2014 to then 
follow the imminent collapsing trend.   
In terms of market prices per ton, the most obvious guess is to have rising 
prices when production starts to shrink and reserves get exhausted, stable prices 
when production is able to supply market needs, but also rising prices when 
productions drops, not because reserves cannot support further extraction but 
because government policies artificially diminish production. Although scenario 3 has 
the potential of benefiting the environment, the communities, and even UMG, the 
gain will be at the expense of diminished government revenues (see run 3 in Figure 
41). Finally, it is uncertain the extent to which the best scenario is one UMG can 
exert influence on. Even though sustainable operations might be more desirable, 
government licenses continue to be government controlled and lie therefore beyond 
UMG’s immediate scope of control. 
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Figure 41 Government revenues under the 3 licensing scenarios 
7.2.2.2. Tonnage per acre  
Three scenarios for the parameter tonnage per acre were designed in order to 
evaluate its effects on the same 5 selected in section 7.2.2.1. The base case scenario 
refers to the default value of 12<<tons/acre>> first used the model. The second 
scenario, named “best is yet to come,” relates to the hypothetical idea that tonnage 
per acre doubles from 2012 onwards to reflect the fact that most of the best quality 
jade has not been extracted in the past. The last and third scenario, “best is gone,” 
is the exact opposite meaning all high quality jade has been mined and what remains 
is much less than expected (see Table 12 and Figure 42).  
Table 12 Scenarios for tonnage per acre  
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Figure 42 Paths in tons per acre 
7.2.2.2.1. Results  
As in the case of a booming in licenses, a booming in more and better “yield” 
per acre is counteracted by the inexorable depletion of jade reserves (see Table 13 
and Figure 43). This means that a greater or a lesser amount of tons per acre does 
not alter the collapsing behavior of jade production or equipment purchases, what it 
does is simply to move such sales and production curves to upper or lower limits 
when compared to the base case scenario. This finding is of revealing nature when we 
consider the weight most players in Myanmar’s mining industry place on the 
uncertainty of deposit characteristics and how they it is the key unknown factor that 
prevents decision makers from planning strategically for the future.  
As in the previous case, jade reserves are greater in scenario 3 but this time 
remaining deposits are of poor quality. Note also the initial value for the stock of 
jade reserves is set using the default tons/acre measure of 12 tons/acre. This 
contributes to having more reserves in all scenarios at the different simulation 
intervals. 
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Figure 43 Results from scenarios in tonnage per acre 
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Table 13 Results from scenarios in tonnage per acre II 
7.2.3. Sensitivity analysis  
Sensitivity analysis serves as a vehicle to not only to determine the effects of 
parameter changes on different measures of model output but also to “develop 
intuition about model structure and guide data collection efforts” (Hekimoglu & 
Barlas, 2010; Sterman, 2000).This section relies on the use of sensitivity analysis to 
test how important the estimation of (a) tonnage per acre, (b) extension of the jade 
mining tract, and (a) government tax rate on jade sales, are for model behavior. A 
list of the chosen parameter inputs and their distributions is shown in Table 14.  
Table 14 Input specifications for sensitivity analysis 
7.2.3.1. Tons per acre  
To simulate the changes in this parameter through time, the distributional 
sensitivity mode with a mean, a standard deviation, and a seed was chosen. Figure 
44 shows the results of different input values of tonnage per acre on (a) equipment 
order rate (market), (b) jade production, (c) jade reserves, and (d) jade price per 
ton. Similar to the results in scenario analysis, changes in the number of jade tons 
that can be mined from an acre of land, do not change the behavior mode of the 
  BASE CASE  BEST IS YET TO COME  BEST IS GONE  
  2015 2018 2021 2015 2018 2021 2015 2018 2021 
ORDER RATE 3,520 3,204 2,829 3,520 3,204 2,829 3,526 2,861 2,479 
JADE PRODUCTION 25,349 18,403 12,000 50,698 36,806 24,000 7,615 2,308 2,620 
JADE RESERVES 171,579 105,237 57,292 43,953 2,025 93 264,610 246,366 240,394 
PRICE PER TON 103,245 102,512 103,785 97,162 142,736 180,713 121,714 113,722 95,591 
MACHINE POPUL. 15,935 16,304 15,708 15,935 16,304 15,708 15,903 16,014 14,116 
 
INPUT  RANGE  DISTRIBUTION 
PROD TONS PER ACRE  [!! = 18; ! = 10; !""# = 5] NORMAL  
INIT INITIAL ACRES AVAILABLE  [30000-100000] INCREMENTAL  
GOVMT GOVERNMENT EMPORIUM TAX  [0.1-0.7] INCREMENTAL  
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chosen variables. In almost all cases, production peaks but then declines as reserves 
start approximating exhaustion.   
Figure 44 Sensitivity analysis results for changes in tons per acre 
7.2.3.2. Jade mining area 
Another often mentioned difficulty involved in forecasting the behavior of jade 
production, jade prices or equipment sales, is the question of how big Myanmar’s 
jade mining area is. The few estimates that could be found are believed to be 
unreliable and therefore the doubt of whether new available figures on jade area 
could alter the development path of Myanmar’s jade industry still remains.  
Using an incremental distribution mode, the parameter for the initial value of 
acres available was subjected to a 10-run sensitivity test. Results shown in Figure 45 
show that regardless the extension of the jade tract, the dynamics of the system 
prevail by not altering the decaying behavior mode of reserves and equipment orders. 
The fact that there might be more or less acres containing jade deposits in Myanmar 
only implies the horizon for extraction gets longer and that decay is inevitable. This 
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assertion is evident by looking at the last graph of Figure 45, “effect of land 
utilization on license demand.” The land utilization effect is a multiplier that 
constraints the inflow of mining licenses as jade reserves are gradually mined: the 
less the reserves, the smaller the land fraction multiplier and vice versa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45 Sensitivity analysis results for changes in the jade mining area 
In run 10, for instance, the area in acres is at its highest (i.e. 100,000) and 
therefore, the effect of land utilization is not as drastic as in run 2 where the area is 
significantly less, and even at a slower extraction pace, deposits they are exhausted 
faster. Going back to run 10, as the influx of licenses is not constrained as much as 
in run 2, production and equipment orders soar. Finally, and most interestingly, even 
RUN # INPUT 
1 30000 
2 37778 
3 45556 
4 53333 
5 61111 
6 68889 
7 76667 
8 84444 
9 92222 
10 100000 
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when the initial value for the mining area of runs 10 and 2 differ considerably, jade 
reserves at the end of the simulation are not that drastically different between both. 
In other words, in face of the existence of a bigger jade tract the behavior will still be 
the same with the difference that the decay of the industry will take longer.  
7.2.3.3. Government emporium tax  
Uncertainty in Myanmar’s mining industry also stems from government 
policies. Among those, taxation on profits from jade sales is of special concern. 
Although not all jade sales are consolidated through government sponsored auctions, 
more and more jade mining companies are finding it more appealing. Inputs for this 
sensitivity test range from the quasi removal of the tax mining companies must pay 
to the government under the “profit-sharing” scheme, to a maximum of 75% increase 
in such a tax.  
 
 
 
Figure 46 Sensitivity analysis results for changes in the government emporium 
tax 
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Following the course of higher taxes, such as in runs 10 or 11, the results are 
evident: higher taxes pose bigger financial constraints to jade mining companies (i.e. 
they must now sustain all their costs with a smaller revenue portion) affecting also 
the purchases of equipment they can make even when high prices led these 
companies to buy more mining licenses and in theory need more equipment. The less 
the equipment, the less the production, and the less the production the higher the 
reserves and the price of jade. Prices increase temporarily until inflated gains from 
sales allow producers to buy equipment, fuel production again, and make prices go 
slightly down as a result of a greater inventory coverage.  
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Chapter 8. Financial policy for jade mining companies  
Except for the most obvious stages such as development and extraction, 
prospecting, exploration, and reclamation activities are virtually absent in 
Myanmar’s mining industry nowadays. A financial analysis sector has therefore been 
included in the model to test whether differences in investment decisions could have 
arisen in the face of a formal financial analysis during the development stage of a 
mine.  
The following sections provide an introduction of all the stages in the mine life 
to incorporate analyses that are new to the jade industry. Although mines are 
certainly not all the same, as they differ in geology, methods of mining, and so on, 
most of the general aspects of mining are common to all mines (Clough, et al., 1965). 
The general aspects or activities in the mine life are grouped below and are briefly 
discussed in the upcoming sections: 
• Prospecting  
• Exploration  
• Development  
• Extraction  
• Reclamation 
8.1. Prospecting and exploration    
Considered by some as two independent steps, prospecting and exploration 
are often combined to refer to the initial work undertaken to determine the size and 
value of an ore deposit (i.e. deposits of rocks from which a metal or mineral can be 
profitably extracted). During this first stage, geologists map the geology of rock 
outcrops (i.e. mapping) and take measurements of the selected exploration site (i.e. 
measuring). Also, representative samples are collected (i.e. sampling) to study the 
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potential tonnage and grade, or richness, of the ore deposit and therefore its value 
(Hartman & Mutmansky, 2002).  
 
Figure 47 Stages in the life of a mine  
Taken from O'Regan and Moles (2006 ), Figure 47 displays the five stages of 
the mining process (excluding reclamation) with mapping, measuring, and sampling 
being classified as “primary exploration” in the exploration phase.  
In particular, jade sampling poses a great challenge to mining experts during 
the exploration stage. Sampling of jade dykes/boulders differs strikingly from 
traditional sampling methods in that it is almost impossible to take samples of jade 
for posterior chemical analyses without injuring the jade first (Win, 1968). It is then 
of no surprise that what Win (1968) reported more than 40 years ago still holds true 
in Myanmar’s mining landscape today. Most companies enter a mining venture, 
namely the acquisition of a mining license and the posterior development of the 
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mine, blindly depending entirely on their luck. Still today the choice of a site 
depends solely upon judgment, experience, and instinct and consists of a quick visit 
to the prospect site by one geologist, one mining engineer, and some locals. 
Besides the geology of jade, other factors such as government regulations also 
impede the undertaking of exhaustive exploration studies in prospect sites. As 
previously mentioned, it is a state-owned enterprise the one in charge of the 
exploration, production (i.e. through joint ventures), and commercialization of jade 
in Myanmar. Hence, at least in the near future, the commissioning of exploration 
tasks to private companies is not expected to take place. Financial estimates for 
exploration will therefore be excluded from the model for now. 
8.2. Development  
Once a deposit has been identified, the work of opening a mineral deposit for 
exploitation begins (Hartman & Mutmansky, 2002). During this stage, a discounted 
cash flow analysis will be incorporated to the model to aid in the evaluation of the 
economic viability of mine development. Cash flow analysis involves simulating what 
is expected to happen in the mine over time in order to make informed decisions on 
whether to proceed or not with the development investment. Such an analysis is 
conducted by subtracting a project’s initial investment (CF0) from the sum its cash 
inflows discounted at a rate equal to the firm’s cost of capital (Mohapatra, 2009)  
!"# = !"#(1+ !)!!!!! − !"! 
Appendix 5 shows the different items included in the calculation of cash 
inflows and outflows throughout the license period. Cash inflows involve the recovery 
factor of the expected jade tonnage times the expected price, whereas cash outflows 
have been condensed into the following categories:  
• Cash outflows at t0 
o Development costs 
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o Equipment costs    
o Other equipment  
o Civil works 
o Miscellaneous development costs 
• Cash outflows at t1, t2, t3, t4, and t5 
o Direct labor costs 
o Administration  
o Production  
o Engineering  
o Maintenance  
o Other personnel 
o Pit and maintenance services costs  
Development costs at t0 relate mainly to equipment purchases and civil works 
(i.e. construction of roads or the installation of water or power facilities). From t1 
onwards, labor and pit/maintenance service costs, strongly associated with the 
operation and maintenance of equipment respectively, comprise the main cash 
outflows of the mine operation (Mohapatra, 2009). Values for all costs have been 
derived from data provided by UMG and one of the interviewed mining companies.  
8.2.1. The discount factor for the NPV analysis  
The discount factor for evaluating mining projects performs the same function 
as it does in the evaluation of any project: it accounts for the time value of money 
and project risk (Taheri, Irannajad, & Ataee-pour, 2009).  Among various other 
methods for estimating discount rates in mining, (a) calculating the WACC (i.e. 
weighted average cost of capital) and (b) summing up the discount rate components, 
stand out as the two most common. Because the latter fits the current financial 
structure of Myanmar’s mining companies better, it has been used as a basis for 
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calculating the discount rate of mining projects in the model. Taheri, et al. (2009) 
describe the summing up discount rate method as follows: ! = !! + !!! + !! 
Where d is the project-specific discount rate, RF the risk-free long-term 
interest rate, RP the risk portion of the project discount rate, and RC the risk 
increment for country risk. In the model, the RF component is represented by the 
normal discount rate whereas the last two elements are combined into a multiplier 
risk factor as follows: !"#!!"#$%&'"!!"#!!"#$!!"#$%&'(!!"#$ =! !"#! "#$%&!!"#$%&'(!!"# * !"#!!"#$!!"#$%&! "#$%&#%'( 
The normal discount rate has been set at 10% whereas the risk factor 
multiplier is the product of the following three risk categories (see Figure 48):!
• Environmental and social, namely environment-related obligations;!
• Regulatory, namely security of tenure; and !
• Political, namely national and political stability  
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Figure 48 Adjusted discount rate 
These three were considered to be the most appropriate for Myanmar’s 
current situation and were chosen among the nine key foreign investment criteria in 
mining listed by Vivoda (2011). Regulatory and political risks are of particular 
concern to jade miners who often see armed conflicts between government forces and 
rebel groups getting heated.  In fact, during the last days of May this year, 
Myanmar’s authorities mandated the suspension of all mining activities in the 
northern Kachin state claiming “armed conflicts in the Pharkant area make it unsafe 
there” (Mizzima, 2012).  
8.2.2. Calculating the discount factor 
The 10% base discount rate “d” increases between 7% ≤ d ≤ 11% depending 
on whether the risk factor is high (i.e. 0) or low (i.e. 1). As shown next, this 
adjustment is done by using the formula for a straight line ! = !" + !, where: 
• m = slope of the line = !!!!!!!!!! 
NPV 
Normal discount rate
NPV 
Adjusted for risk discount rate
NPV Discount rate
NPV Risk factor multiplier
NPV
Actual political stability
NPV
Actual security of tenure
NPV
Max company experience 
in the country
EFF Effect of security of 
tenure on perceived risk
~
NPV
Actual company experience
 in the country
NPV
Max political stability
EFF Effect of political 
stability on perceived risk
~
NPV
Max security of tenure
EFF Effect of environmental and
social regulations
~
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• c = point at which it cuts the y-axis 
• x = risk factor 
Assuming,  
• 11% (y1) applies to complete risk or 0 (x1), and 
• 7% (y2) applies to no risk or 1 (x2) 
It follows,  ! = 7− 111− 0 = −41 = −4 
Finally,  ! = !" + ! ! = −4 ∗ !"#$!!"#$%& + 11 
When there is no risk the discount factor will reach the normal long-term loan 
interest rate in Myanmar, that is 17% (10% base rate + 7% at low risk) (The World 
Bank, 2012b), whereas when risk starts increasing, the discount rate can go beyond 
17% up to 21% (10% base rate + 11% at high risk). The smoothed formula for the 
adjusted discount rate is presented below: !"#!!"#$%&'"!!"#!!"#$!!"#$%&'(!!"#$ = !"#! "#$%&!!"#$%&'(!!"#$ + ((−4 ∗ !"#$1(!"#!!"#$!!"#$%&! "#$%&#%'(, 6/12+ 11)/100) 
8.3. Exploitation  
To review the financial dynamics of extraction or exploration refer to section 
6.3.6.  
8.4. Reclamation  
Reclamation refers to the process of closing a mine, recountouring, 
revegetating, and restoring the water and land value of a mined area (Hartman & 
Mutmansky, 2002). Although Myanmar’s mining law (1994) does discuss the duties 
of small and large scale mining companies to “arrange backfill, revegetation or 
reclaim the land in the areas already mined out to the satisfaction of the Ministry” 
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(Images Asia & Pan Kachin Development Society, 2004), there are no enforcement 
mechanisms in place to ensure this duty is carried out in practice. Reclamation 
activities have been therefore left out from the model as, besides from not being 
performed, they do not bring about any relevant dynamic to subject matter being 
investigated.  
8.5.  Implementing the NPV policy  
A detailed financial analysis structure was added to the model in order to test 
the impact of formal financial assessments on the demand for mining licenses. The 
goal is to understand how prices and costs interact and produce positive or negative 
NPV results, thus encouraging or discouraging applications for further mining 
licenses. As mentioned previously, mining companies in Myanmar rely only on 
instinct at the moment of acquiring licenses. No formal evaluation is made on the 
premise that the market is so uncertain, complex, and fragmented that any 
assessment will most likely result in a futile endeavor.  
For UMG it becomes particularly important to be aware of how a possible 
switch in the financial mindset of mining companies could feedback to purchases of 
mining equipment in the future. Figure 50 recycles the scenarios introduced in 
section 7.2.2.1 to test the impact of active and inactive NPV assessments at the 
moment of evaluating mining development projects. The rest of model parameters 
described in the stock-and-flow section remain the same.  
8.5.1. Runs 1 and 2 
Results suggest that in the case of runs 1 and 2, where licenses are set to their 
base case, discounted cash flow analyses do not make a striking difference in 
equipment purchases since revenues always exceed costs throughout the complete 
simulation and, in the presence of a continuous positive NPV, no development 
proposal is rejected. The rejection measure of projects is given by the third variable 
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in the second column of Figure 50 named “MRK analysis negative output rate.” The 
negative output rate is an outflow from the licenses under analysis stock that 
discards license proposals, after an analysis delay, when their NPV is negative (see 
Figure 49). In contrast to scenarios 1 and 2, the presence or absence of an NPV 
analysis does make a difference in scenarios 3 and 4, especially in regards to 
equipment ordering and production. The following two sections present an analysis 
of each run. 
 
Figure 49 Structure for the evaluation of licenses 
8.5.2. Run 3: booming mining licenses and no financial analysis  
In the presence of an aggressive licensing campaign and the absence of a due 
financial analysis in run 3, equipment orders and jade production increase much 
more than in the remaining 3 scenarios, even though increases in the “negative 
output rate,” or the measure of investment rejection in the model, would have 
advised mining investments during this period not to be undertaken. A negative 
NPV results from jade prices not being able to keep up with the vast amount of new 
machinery a boom in mining licenses requires. In this framework, costs exceed 
prospect revenues and a negative NPV follows.  
Final NPV Mining investment
MRK 
Analysis negative 
output rate
MRK 
Mining license supply
SWITCH 
Mine development
 analysis
MRK 
Licenses under analysis
MRK 
Effective mining license supply
EFF 
Effect of land utilization 
fraction on license demand
~
MRK 
Analysis input rate
MRK 
Analysis positive
 output rate
MRK 
Analysis delay
Decision 
to develop  
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In the absence of a financial analysis, orders of equipment are made, 
production climbs, inventories increase, and price drops until despite the increasing 
trend in license demand, equipment orders and production start falling as land and 
reserves begin to deplete and the government begins to grant less and less 
concessions. When reserves start decreasing, price rises, and again despite the 
willingness to keep investing in licensing, there is simply less and less available for 
further exploitation.  
8.5.3. Run 4: booming mining licenses and the presence of 
financial analysis  
When the switch for NPV analysis is activated, mining companies refrain 
from investing in further mining licenses in the advent of negative NPV results. In 
the face of no new land, orders drop at around 2014, and so does production. The 
decrease in production causes a drop in the inventory coverage, which in turn raises 
the jade price. The expansion loop kicks off as prospects of high profitability have 
now arisen. Positive NPVs (backed up by a higher jade price) prompt the further 
application of licenses, the jump in production and in inventory coverage, and the 
subsequent drop in price. This cycle will repeat once again, until the exhaustion of 
land and reserves prevent further extraction from taking place.  
8.6. Policy insights 
Runs 3 and 4 are especially valuable in portraying how different risk profiles 
in mining investment have not isolated effects but rather feedback into production 
and therefore into prices, as shown by the simulation results. Also, though until now 
jade prices have exceeded all the costs involved in mining operations, there might 
come times when regardless the nature of the jade deposit prospected, investing in 
mining licenses might result in financial losses. If this is the case and a due financial 
analysis is performed, the impact on UMG will be simply decreased sales.  
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Figure 50 Four scenarios for a hypothetical switch in mining financial analysis 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions  
Myanmar’s jade mining industry has proved to be a system whose behavior is 
determined by the dynamics of its underlying structure.  This thesis has answered 
the main research question related to cause of the oscillatory or cyclical nature of 
purchases of jade mining equipment and has shed light on the future of the industry 
as a whole and how this future feedbacks to UMG and its customers.  
Given the interconnected dynamics of all the elements in the jade system, it is 
rather difficult to suggest an investment scheme that could stabilize equipment 
purchases either for UMG customers or for the aggregate of mining companies in the 
industry. Model results, though, serve as a fundamental to start considering industry 
dynamics during the preparation of sales forecasts of mining equipment.  
Regarding the growth objective of UMG, it is advised the client firm must 
reshape its growth strategy to better fit industry prospects which show the imminent 
collapsing trend of mineable land, reserves, and with that a gradual decay in 
equipment purchases.  
Furthermore, despite the uncertainty lying behind most of the model 
parameters and the complexity inherent to the jade itself, this model proved 
insensitive to parameter changes and being able to provide, backed up by empirical 
data, a hypothesis of industry behavior. This evidences how many insights can result 
even in the presence of imperfect or scarce information.  
 
Jorgen Tessman: “About the future! My God, we know nothing about it.” 
Eilert Lovborg: “No, but there are things to be said about it”  
 
Henrik Ibsen in his play Hedda Gabler  
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Chapter 10. Limitations  
Health hazards to workers and other sharp environmental degradation issues 
that are widespread in Myanmar´s mining locations have not been included in the 
model.  
Upgrades in mining technology have been excluded as well. Although major 
technological innovations have improved operations in the energy sector for example, 
technological changes in mining have not been as radical as to induce significant 
shakeout in their own right (Bartos, 2007 ).  
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Appendix 1. A note on building reference modes 
At the moment of starting this project, I was provided with an exceptionally 
vague and quick description (not resulting from lack of willingness but rather from 
lack of time from the “problem owner”) of the problem I was commissioned to 
investigate. After a couple of days of data gathering and analysis, the first reference 
mode displayed in Figure 7 emerged, causing a shocking surprise to UMG’s general 
and sales manager respectively. What to me seemed a mere graphic representation 
taken from their everyday data, to them it was a depiction they had not been 
confronted to in the past. The reason for this resides in UMG’s performance 
measurement system, which uses key performance indicators or KPIs to measure 
performance across the entire organization.  
KPIs are mostly used for “measuring the degree of accomplishment of the 
defined objectives based on expected results” (Rodriguez, Alfaro, & Ortiz, 2009). As 
in many other organizations today, the need for dealing with increasingly expanding 
and complex operations prompted UMG to adopt a standard tool to define and 
measure progress quantitatively. Aided by performance indicators, variations 
between desired and actual results across the different units and departments at 
UMG are reported on a month-to-month basis contrasting them only to last year’s 
results and thus failing to recognize important trends that might be developing over 
time. This is the reason why when confronted with a graph that plotted perhaps one 
of their most critical indicators (i.e. sales of equipment units) over time, both the 
general and sales manager reacted with such astonishment.   
The presence of an overwhelming quantity of KPIs also hinders the ability of 
top managers at UMG to concentrate in the understanding what really matters. 
Indeed =, a poor understanding of the dynamic drivers in the mining industry is 
reflected in the way equipment orders are raised by UMG to their principals today. 
Currently, orders are made on the basis of (a) expectations of random political or 
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ethnic outrages in the mining sites, and (b) prospects of sales growth set by upper 
management and salesmen themselves. Equipment orders are therefore assembled in 
a way that entirely disregards industry dynamics and how they influence purchases 
of mining equipment.  
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Appendix 2. Jade color wheel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mason-Kay (2012) 
 
              Average per year 
SOURCE EDITION MONTH / YEAR TOTAL 
VISITORS  
FOREIGN 
VISITORS 
JADE 
LOTS 
OFFERED 
JADE 
LOTS 
SOLD  
  TOTAL 
VISITORS 
% 
CHANGE 
FOREIGN 
VISITORS 
% 
CHANGE  
JADE 
LOTS 
OFFERED 
% 
CHANGE 
JADE 
LOTS 
SOLD  
% 
CHANGE 
1 
40TH  MARCH 2003 1270 635 1254 503                   
12TH  OCTOBER 2003 914 457 1042 348   1092   546   1148   426   
2, 2.1 
41ST  MARCH 2004 1200 600 - -                   
1ST  JULY 2004  - - - -                   
13TH OCTOBER 2004 - - 1412 989   1200 10% 600 10% 1412 23% 989 132% 
3, 3.1, 
3.2 
42ND MARCH 2005 1220 792 1711 1198                   
2ND JULY 2005  - - - -                   
14th  October 2005 1436 737 2154 1508   1328 11% 765 27% 1933 37% 1353 37% 
4, 4.1, 
2.1 
43rd  March 2006 2359 1000 2459 1721                   
3rd July 2006 - - - -                   
15th October 2006 2000 1000 4237 2966   2180 64% 1000 31% 3348 73% 2344 73% 
5, 5.1, 
5.2, 5.3, 
5.4 
44th  March 2007 3419 2068 5217 3652                   
4th  July 2007 4000 2200 5880 4600                   
16th  November 2007 3616 2300 5500 3618   3678 69% 2189 119% 5532 65% 3957 69% 
6 
45th  March 2008  6000 3000 7700 5390                   
5th July 2008 - - - -                   
17th November 2008 - - - -   6000 63% 3000 37% 7700 39% 5390 36% 
7, 7.1, 
7.2, 7.3 
46th  March 2009 4600 2300 5000 3500                   
6th  June 2009 6000 3000 - -                   
18th   October 2009 4000 2000 8140 5698   4867 -19% 2433 -19% 6570 -15% 4599 -15% 
8, 8.1, 
8.2 
47th  March 2010 6000 3000 10000 7000                   
7th  July 2010 - - 11500 8050                   
19th  November 2010 6700 4000 13081 9157   6350 30% 3500 44% 11527 75% 8069 75% 
9, 9.1, 
9.2, 9.3 
48th  March 2011 8700 4719 20000 13608                   
8th  July 2011 9366 5000 22317 15149                   
20th  December 2011 5300 1600 12000 8300   7789 23% 3773 8% 18106 57% 12352 53% 
10, 
10.1 
49th  March 2012 6000 3000 16697 9762                   
9th July 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A                   
21st December 2012 N/A N/A N/A N/A   6000 -23% 3000 -20% 16697 -8% 9762 -21% 
 
 
Appendix 3. Myanmar’s jade emporium data 
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Appendix 4. Sources of Myanmar’s gem emporium data 
1 http://www.myanmargems.com/jade_remains_yardstick_for_gemindustry.htm   
2 http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/03/09/xinhua-myanmar-to-hold-gems-
 emporium/ 
2.1 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/19/eng20061019_313505.html     
3 http://missions.itu.int/~myanmar/e-com/050403_jade/gems.htm        
3.1 http://www.myanemb-sa.net/news/previous%20news/october/06-10-05.htm   
3.2 http://www.myanemb-sa.net/news/previous%20news/october/08-10-05.htm   
4 http://www.myanmargems.com/43myanma_gems_emporium.htm      
4.1
 http://www.kaladanpress.org/v3/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
5 27:burma-gems 
  -corporation-display-more-jade-at-gems-emporium&catid=53:march-2006&Itemid=2 
5 http://www.myanmargems.com/myanmargems_emporium_biggestever.htm   
5.1 www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4896c48d1e.html           
5.2 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/10/content_7585414.htm     
5.3 http://www.mmtimes.com/no389/b007.htm             
5.4 http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=8316&l=1      
6 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/27/content_9721366.htm     
7 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-08/23/content_11930018.htm     
7.1 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/13/content_12045884.htm     
7.2 http://www.bbrtv.com/2010/0328/2022.html          
   
7.3 http://www.burmanet.org/news/2009/03/24/associated-press-gem-sales-earn-
 myanmar-191- million/ 
8 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2011-03/10/c_13770779.htm   
8.1 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/business/2010-06/28/c_13373777.htm   
8.2 http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/7287472.html      
9 http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/business/577/biz57701.html       
9.1 http://www.mmtimes.com/2011/business/584/biz58403.html       
9.2 http://www.visit2burma.com/news-events/gems-emporium/      
   
9.3 http://www.mmtimes.com/2012/business/609/biz60904.html      
10 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-03/09/c_131457034.htm     
10.1 http://www.bullionstreet.com/news/recovering-myanmar-hit-by-sharp-dips-in-gem-
 sales/1 
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Appendix 5. Net present value analysis  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  YEAR  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 
CASH INFLOWS             
JADEITE PRODUCTION (TONS)             
PRICE PER TON             
TOTAL REVENUES             
CASH OUTFLOWS              
DEVELOPMENT COSTS              
1. EQUIPMENT COSTS              
EXCAVATORS              
TRUCKS              
DRILLING MACHINES              
DOZERS              
TOTAL EQUIPMENT COSTS              
2. OTHER EQUIPMENT              
REPAIR EQUIPMENT              
CUTTING EQUIPMENT              
LIGHT VEHICLES              
TOTAL OTHER EQUIPMENT COSTS              
3. CIVIL WORKS              
HOUSING              
ROADS             
WATER SUPPLY              
TOTAL CIVIL WORKS COST              
4. MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENT 
COSTS              
LAND PURCHASE             
EXPLOXIVES              
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT COSTS              
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LABOR COSTS             
1. ADMINISTRATION             
GENERAL MANAGER             
PROCUREMENT             
FINANCE & ACCOUNTING             
TOTAL ADMINISTRATION LABOR COSTS             
2. PRODUCTION             
2.1 OPERATORS              
EXCAVATOR DRIVER             
TRUCK DRIVER             
DRILLING MACHINE DRIVER             
DOZER DRIVER              
2.2 OTHERS              
STONEFINDER CREW             
TOTAL PRODUCTION LABOR COST              
3. ENGINEERING             
MINING ENGINEER             
TOTAL ENGINEERING LABOR COSTS              
4. MAINTENANCE              
WORKSHOP SUPERVISOR              
MECHANICS              
TOTAL MAINTENANCE LABOR COSTS              
5. PERSONNEL              
OTHERS              
TOTAL OTHER PERSONNEL LABOR COSTS             
TOTAL LABOR COSTS              
INDIRECT COSTS             
1. PIT AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES             
FUEL EXCAVATORS             
FUEL TRUCKS              
FUEL DRILLING MACHINES             
FUEL DOZERS             
SPARE PARTS EXCAVATORS             
SPARE PARTS TRUCKS             
SPARE PARTS DRILLING MACHINES             
SPARE PARTS DOZERS             
TOTAL PIT AND MAINTENANCE SERVICES 
COSTS              
TOTAL INDIRECT COSTS             
GOVERNMENT CHARGES             
ROYALTY TAX ON SALES             
TOTAL GOVERNMENT CHARGES             
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Appendix 6. Equation list 
FIN_Cash(t) = FIN_Cash(t - dt) + (FIN__Clearing_second_pymt + 
FIN__Clearing_downpayment - FIN__Cash_outflow_rate) * dt 
INIT FIN_Cash = 0 
INFLOWS: 
FIN__Clearing_second_pymt = 
FIN__Accounts_receivable_second_pymt/FIN__Clearing_delay__second_pymt 
FIN__Clearing_downpayment = 
FIN__Accounts_receivable_downpayment/FIN__Clearing_delay__downpayment 
OUTFLOWS: 
FIN__Cash_outflow_rate = 
FIN_Total_cashflows_t0+FIN_Total_operator_salary_costs+FIN_Total_other_labor_costs+FIN
__Cost_of_equipment__purchased+FIN__Total_pit_and_maintenance_costs+GOVMT_Tax_p
ymts_on_raw_production 
FIN_Expected_unit_variable_costs(t) = FIN_Expected_unit_variable_costs(t - dt) + 
(FIN_Change_in_expected__unit_variable_cost) * dt 
INIT FIN_Expected_unit_variable_costs = 15000 
INFLOWS: 
FIN_Change_in_expected__unit_variable_cost = (FIN__Unit_variable_cost-
FIN_Expected_unit_variable_costs)/FIN_Expected_unit_variable__cost_adjustment_delay 
FIN__Accounts_receivable_downpayment(t) = FIN__Accounts_receivable_downpayment(t - dt) 
+ (FIN__Change_in_accounts_receivable__downpayment - FIN__Clearing_downpayment) * dt 
INIT FIN__Accounts_receivable_downpayment = 0 
INFLOWS: 
FIN__Change_in_accounts_receivable__downpayment = 
FIN__After_tax_revenues*FIN__Downpayment_fraction 
OUTFLOWS: 
FIN__Clearing_downpayment = 
FIN__Accounts_receivable_downpayment/FIN__Clearing_delay__downpayment 
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FIN__Accounts_receivable_second_pymt(t) = FIN__Accounts_receivable_second_pymt(t - dt) + 
(FIN_Change_in_accounts_receivable__second_pymt - FIN__Clearing_second_pymt) * dt 
INIT FIN__Accounts_receivable_second_pymt = 0 
INFLOWS: 
FIN_Change_in_accounts_receivable__second_pymt = FIN__After_tax_revenues*(1-
FIN__Downpayment_fraction) 
OUTFLOWS: 
FIN__Clearing_second_pymt = 
FIN__Accounts_receivable_second_pymt/FIN__Clearing_delay__second_pymt 
LND__Acres_exploited(t) = LND__Acres_exploited(t - dt) + (LND___exploitation_rate) * dt 
INIT LND__Acres_exploited = 0 
INFLOWS: 
LND___exploitation_rate = 
(PROD_Effective_production_capacity*EFF_Effect_of_acres_availability__on_exploitation)*1 
LND__Acres_transferred(t) = LND__Acres_transferred(t - dt) + 
(LND__Acres_transferring__rate - LND___exploitation_rate) * dt 
INIT LND__Acres_transferred = 800 
INFLOWS: 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate = MRK__License_approval__rate*LND__Acres_per_license 
OUTFLOWS: 
LND___exploitation_rate = 
(PROD_Effective_production_capacity*EFF_Effect_of_acres_availability__on_exploitation)*1 
LND__Proven_reserves__in_acres(t) = LND__Proven_reserves__in_acres(t - dt) + (- 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate) * dt 
INIT LND__Proven_reserves__in_acres = LND__Initial_acres__available 
OUTFLOWS: 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate = MRK__License_approval__rate*LND__Acres_per_license 
MRK_Expected_price_by_miners(t) = MRK_Expected_price_by_miners(t - dt) + 
(MRK_Change_in_expected__price_by_miners) * dt 
INIT MRK_Expected_price_by_miners = 100000 
INFLOWS: 
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MRK_Change_in_expected__price_by_miners = (MRK__Effective_jade_price_per_ton-
MRK_Expected_price_by_miners)/MRK_Expected_price_long_run__adjustment_delay 
MRK_Expected_sales_rate(t) = MRK_Expected_sales_rate(t - dt) + 
(MRK_Change_in_expected_sales__rate) * dt 
INIT MRK_Expected_sales_rate = 
MRK_Population_of__consumers*MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements 
INFLOWS: 
MRK_Change_in_expected_sales__rate = (MRK_Jade_sales_rate-
MRK_Expected_sales_rate)/MRK_Expected_sales_rate_adjustment_delay 
MRK_Jade_at_warehouses(t) = MRK_Jade_at_warehouses(t - dt) + 
(PRO__Jade_transportation__rate - MRK_Jade_sales_rate) * dt 
INIT MRK_Jade_at_warehouses = 40000 
INFLOWS: 
PRO__Jade_transportation__rate = ((PRO__Jade_extracted*(1-PRO__Dillution_fraction))*1) 
OUTFLOWS: 
MRK_Jade_sales_rate = 
MIN(MRK__Max_jade_sales__rate,((MRK_Population_of__consumers*MRK__Effective_per_c
apita_consumption_requirements))) 
MRK_Licenses__approved(t) = MRK_Licenses__approved(t - dt) + 
(MRK__License_approval__rate) * dt 
INIT MRK_Licenses__approved = 0 
INFLOWS: 
MRK__License_approval__rate = MRK_Licenses__available/LND__License_approval_delay 
MRK_Licenses__available(t) = MRK_Licenses__available(t - dt) + 
(MRK__License_application_rate - MRK__License_approval__rate) * dt 
INIT MRK_Licenses__available = 50 
INFLOWS: 
MRK__License_application_rate = MRK__Effective_mining__license_supply 
OUTFLOWS: 
MRK__License_approval__rate = MRK_Licenses__available/LND__License_approval_delay 
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MRK_Population_of__consumers(t) = MRK_Population_of__consumers(t - dt) + 
(MRK_Change_in_population__of_consumers) * dt 
INIT MRK_Population_of__consumers = 6000 
INFLOWS: 
MRK_Change_in_population__of_consumers = IF SWITCH__Population_growth=1 THEN 
MRK_Population_of__consumers*MRK_Percentage_change_in_population ELSE  0 
MRK__Expected_price_short_run(t) = MRK__Expected_price_short_run(t - dt) + 
(MRK_Change_expected_in_price__short_run) * dt 
INIT MRK__Expected_price_short_run = 100000 
INFLOWS: 
MRK_Change_expected_in_price__short_run = (MRK__Effective_jade_price_per_ton-
MRK__Expected_price_short_run)/MRK_Expected_price_short_run__adjustment_delay 
MRK__Jade_sold(t) = MRK__Jade_sold(t - dt) + (MRK_Jade_sales_rate) * dt 
INIT MRK__Jade_sold = 0 
INFLOWS: 
MRK_Jade_sales_rate = 
MIN(MRK__Max_jade_sales__rate,((MRK_Population_of__consumers*MRK__Effective_per_c
apita_consumption_requirements))) 
MRK__Licenses_under_analysis(t) = MRK__Licenses_under_analysis(t - dt) + 
(MRK__Analysis_input_rate - MRK__Analysis_positive__output_rate - 
MRK__Analysis_negative__output_rate) * dt 
INIT MRK__Licenses_under_analysis = 1 
INFLOWS: 
MRK__Analysis_input_rate = MRK__Mining_license_supply 
OUTFLOWS: 
MRK__Analysis_positive__output_rate = IF Final_NPV_Mining_investment>0 THEN 
MRK__Licenses_under_analysis/MRK__Analysis_delay ELSE 0  
MRK__Analysis_negative__output_rate = IF Final_NPV_Mining_investment<0 THEN 
MRK__Licenses_under_analysis/MRK__Analysis_delay ELSE 0  
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MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements(t) = 
MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements(t - dt) + 
(MRK__Change_in_per_capita_consumption_requirements) * dt 
INIT MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements = 5 
INFLOWS: 
MRK__Change_in_per_capita_consumption_requirements = 
(MRK_Equilibrium_per_capita_consumption-
MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements)/MRK_Consumption_requirements__adjustment
_delay 
NOISE__Pink_noise(t) = NOISE__Pink_noise(t - dt) + (NOISE_Change_in_pink_noise) * dt 
INIT NOISE__Pink_noise = 1 
INFLOWS: 
NOISE_Change_in_pink_noise = (NOISE__White_noise-
NOISE__Pink_noise)/NOISE_Adjustment_delay 
PROD_Customer_mining_equipment(t) = PROD_Customer_mining_equipment(t - dt) + 
(PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate - PROD__Mining_equipment__srapping_rate) * dt 
INIT PROD_Customer_mining_equipment = 750 
INFLOWS: 
PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate = 
PROD_Desired_delivery_rate*PROD_Order_fulfillment__ratio 
OUTFLOWS: 
PROD__Mining_equipment__srapping_rate = 
(PROD_Customer_mining_equipment/PROD__Scrapping_delay)*1 
PROD__Accumulated_sales_UMG(t) = PROD__Accumulated_sales_UMG(t - dt) + 
(PROD__Change_in_accumulated__sales_UMG) * dt 
INIT PROD__Accumulated_sales_UMG = 0 
INFLOWS: 
PROD__Change_in_accumulated__sales_UMG = PROD_Order_rate_UMG 
PROD__Order_backlog(t) = PROD__Order_backlog(t - dt) + (PROD_Order_rate_market - 
PROD__Order_fulfillment__rate) * dt 
INIT PROD__Order_backlog = 1 
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INFLOWS: 
PROD_Order_rate_market = PROD_Actual_equipment__order 
OUTFLOWS: 
PROD__Order_fulfillment__rate = PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate 
PROD__Total_equipment_sold(t) = PROD__Total_equipment_sold(t - dt) + 
(PROD__Order_fulfillment__rate) * dt 
INIT PROD__Total_equipment_sold = 0 
INFLOWS: 
PROD__Order_fulfillment__rate = PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate 
PROD__UMG_mining_equipment_inventory(t) = 
PROD__UMG_mining_equipment_inventory(t - dt) + (- 
PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate) * dt 
INIT PROD__UMG_mining_equipment_inventory = 10000000000000000000000000 
OUTFLOWS: 
PROD_Mining_equipment__delivery_rate = 
PROD_Desired_delivery_rate*PROD_Order_fulfillment__ratio 
PRO_Jade_reserves(t) = PRO_Jade_reserves(t - dt) + (- PRO_Jade_depletion_rate) * dt 
INIT PRO_Jade_reserves = LND__Initial_acres__available*PROD_Effective_tons_per_acre 
OUTFLOWS: 
PRO_Jade_depletion_rate = 
min(PRO_Jade_reserves/PRO_Min_time_for__depletion,PROD__Jade_production_in_tons) 
PRO__Jade_extracted(t) = PRO__Jade_extracted(t - dt) + (PRO_Jade_depletion_rate - 
PRO__Jade_transportation__rate - PRO__Jade_dillution_rate) * dt 
INIT PRO__Jade_extracted = 20000 
INFLOWS: 
PRO_Jade_depletion_rate = 
min(PRO_Jade_reserves/PRO_Min_time_for__depletion,PROD__Jade_production_in_tons) 
OUTFLOWS: 
PRO__Jade_transportation__rate = ((PRO__Jade_extracted*(1-PRO__Dillution_fraction))*1) 
PRO__Jade_dillution_rate = PRO__Jade_extracted*PRO__Dillution_fraction 
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Final_NPV_Mining_investment = 
(NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_1+NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_2+NPV_Discounted_cash_
flow_yr_3+NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_4+NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_5)-
NPV_t0_Total_cash_outflows 
FIN_Average_yearly_fuel_req = 54900 
FIN_Budget_for_equipment = FIN_Cash/NPV_Average_equipment_cost 
FIN_Expected_unit_variable__cost_adjustment_delay = 6/12 
FIN_Land_cost = LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_t0_Acre_cost 
FIN_Total_cashflows_t0 = FIN__Total_civil_works_costs+FIN__Total_development_costs 
FIN_Total_operator_salary_costs = 
NPV_Average_operator_salary*PRO__Equipment_used_per_year*NPV_Average_driver_req_pe
r_equipment 
FIN_Total_other_labor_costs = 
(PRO__Equipment_used_per_year*NPV_t0_Stone_finders_per_equipment*NPV_PROD_Stone
_finder_crew_yearly_salary)+ 
(PRO__Equipment_used_per_year*NPV_mechanics_per_equipment*NPV_MAINT_Mechanics_
yearly_salary) 
FIN__After_tax_revenues = FIN__Revenues_from_jade_sales*(1-
GOVMT_Emporium_government_tax)  
FIN__Clearing_delay__downpayment = 1/12 
FIN__Clearing_delay__second_pymt = 5/12 
FIN__Cost_of_equipment__purchased = 
PROD__Order_fulfillment__rate*NPV_Average_equipment_cost 
FIN__Downpayment_fraction = 0.5 
FIN__Explosives_cost = FIN__Explosive_units*NPV_t0_Explosive_cost 
FIN__Explosive_units = LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_Exploxives_per_acre 
FIN__Revenues_from_jade_sales = 
MRK_Jade_sales_rate*MRK__Effective_jade_price_per_ton 
FIN__Total_civil_works_costs = 
FIN__Total_housing_costs+FIN__Total_power__supply_costs+FIN__Total_road_costs+FIN_
_Total_water_supply_costs 
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FIN__Total_development_costs = FIN_Land_cost+FIN__Explosives_cost 
FIN__Total_fuel_costs = 
FIN_Average_yearly_fuel_req*NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon*PRO__Equipment_used_per_year 
FIN__Total_housing_costs = 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_t0_Housing_cost*NPV_t0_Housing_req__per_acre 
FIN__Total_pit_and_maintenance_costs = 
FIN__Total_fuel_costs+FIN__Total_spare_parts_cost 
FIN__Total_power__supply_costs = 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_t0_Power_supply_cost*NPV_t0_Power_supply__req_pe
r_acre 
FIN__Total_road_costs = 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_t0_Road_cost*NPV_t0_Road_req__per_acre 
FIN__Total_spare_parts_cost = 
NPV_EOC_Average_spare_parts_cost*PRO__Equipment_used_per_year*NPV__EOC_avg_sp
are_parts_per_equipment 
FIN__Total_water_supply_costs = 
LND__Acres_transferring__rate*NPV_t0_Water_supply_cost*NPV_t0_Water_supply__req_p
er_acre 
FIN__Unit_variable_cost = 
(FIN_Total_operator_salary_costs+FIN_Total_other_labor_costs+FIN__Total_pit_and_mainte
nance_costs)/PROD__Jade_production_in_tons 
GOVMT_Desired_government__revenue = 2000000000 
GOVMT_Effective_price_per_ton_on_appraisal = 
MRK_Expected_price_by_miners*GOVMT_Fraction_of_price_on_appraisal 
GOVMT_Emporium_government_tax = 0.4 
GOVMT_Fraction_of_price_on_appraisal = 0.1 
GOVMT_Tax_fraction_on_raw_production = 0.2 
GOVMT_Tax_pymts_on_raw_production = 
(PROD__Jade_production_in_tons*GOVMT_Effective_price_per_ton_on_appraisal)*GOVMT_
Tax_fraction_on_raw_production 
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GOVMT__Gap_ratio = 
GOVMT__Government_revenue_gap/GOVMT_Desired_government__revenue 
GOVMT__Government_reporting__delay = 1/12 
GOVMT__Government_revenues_from_jade_sales_and_licenses = 
FIN__Revenues_from_jade_sales-FIN__After_tax_revenues+FIN_Land_cost 
GOVMT__Government_revenue_gap = SMTH1(GOVMT_Desired_government__revenue-
GOVMT__Government_revenues_from_jade_sales_and_licenses,GOVMT__Government_reporti
ng__delay) 
LDN__Land_utilization_fraction = 
(LND__Proven_reserves__in_acres/LND__Initial_acres__available)*1 
LND_Max_acres__exploitation_rate = LND__Acres_transferred/LND_Min_exploitation_time 
LND_Min_exploitation_time = 10/12 
LND__Acres_per_license = 1 
LND__Initial_acres__available = 50000*1+30000*0 
LND__License_approval_delay = 6/12 
Max_equipment__utilization_Cutting_equipment = 10 
Max_equipment__utilization_Light_vehicle = 20 
Max_equipment__utilization_Repair_equipment = 8 
MRK_Consumption_requirements__adjustment_delay = 4/12 
MRK_Desired_inventory__coverage = 4/12 
MRK_Expected_price_long_run__adjustment_delay = 2/12 
MRK_Expected_price_short_run__adjustment_delay = 1/12 
MRK_Expected_sales_rate_adjustment_delay = 4/12 
MRK_Inventory_coverage = MRK_Jade_at_warehouses/MRK_Expected_sales_rate 
MRK_Percentage_change_in_population = 0.35 
MRK_Relative_inventory__coverage = 
MRK_Inventory_coverage/MRK_Desired_inventory__coverage 
MRK__Analysis_delay = 1/12 
MRK__Effective_mining__license_supply = (IF SWITCH__Mine_development__analysis=1 
THEN 
MRK__Analysis_positive__output_rate*EFF__Effect_of_land_utilization__fraction_on_license
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_demand ELSE 
MRK__Mining_license_supply*EFF__Effect_of_land_utilization__fraction_on_license_demand) 
MRK__Effective_per_capita_consumption_requirements = IF SWITCH_Noise=1 THEN 
MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements*NOISE__Pink_noise ELSE 
MRK__Per_capita_consumption__requirements 
MRK__Expected_markup = 
MRK__Expected_price_short_run/FIN_Expected_unit_variable_costs 
MRK__Max_jade_sales__rate = MRK_Jade_at_warehouses/MRK__Min_time__to_sell 
MRK__Mining_license_supply = 
(MRK__Desired_mining_licenses)*0+(RM__Licenses_granted)*1+(IF 
SWITCH_SCE_Licenses_1=1 THEN SCE_1_Mining_rush ELSE SCE_2_Responsible_mining)*0 
MRK__Min_time__to_sell = 1 
NOISE_Adjustment_delay = 1 
NOISE_Random = RANDOM(0.1,5,5) 
NOISE_SD = 0.03 
NOISE__DT = DT 
NOISE__Mean = 0.7 
NOISE__White_noise = 
NOISE__Mean+NOISE_SD*((24*NOISE_Adjustment_delay/NOISE__DT)^0.5)*NOISE_Rando
m 
NPV_Actual_company_experience__in_the_country = 1 
NPV_Actual_political_stability = 1 
NPV_Actual_security_of_tenure = 1 
NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting = 
NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting_yearly_salary*NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting_req 
NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting_req = 1 
NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting_yearly_salary = 36000 
NPV_ADM_General_manager = 
NPV_ADM_General_manager_yearly_salary*NPV_ADM_General_manager_req 
NPV_ADM_General_manager_req = 1 
NPV_ADM_General_manager_yearly_salary = 60000 
 137 
NPV_ADM_Procurement = 
NPV_ADM_Procurement_yearly_salary*NPV_ADM_Procurement_req 
NPV_ADM_Procurement_req = 1 
NPV_ADM_Procurement_yearly_salary = 36000 
NPV_After_tax_profit_yr1 = NPV_Pre_tax_profit*(1-NPV_Taxes_rate) 
NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_2 = NPV_Pre_tax_profit*(1-NPV_Taxes_rate) 
NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_3 = NPV_Pre_tax_profit*(1-NPV_Taxes_rate) 
NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_4 = NPV_Pre_tax_profit*(1-NPV_Taxes_rate) 
NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_5 = NPV_Pre_tax_profit*(1-NPV_Taxes_rate) 
NPV_Average_driver_req_per_equipment = 
(NPV_dozer_drivers_per_equipment+NPV_drilling_machine_drivers_per_equipment+NPV_exca
vator_drivers_per_equipment+NPV_truck_drivers_per_equipment)/4 
NPV_Average_equipment_cost = 
(NPV_t0_Dozer_cost+NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_cost+NPV_t0_Excavator_cost+NPV_t0_Tru
ck_cost)/4 
NPV_Average_operator_salary = 
(NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver_yearly_salary+NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver_yearly_salary
+NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver_yearly_salary+NPV_PROD_Truck_driver_yearly_salary)/4 
NPV_Average_penetration_in_acres__per_hour = 
PROD_Max_acres_handled__per_mining_equipment_per_month/(PROD__Days_in_a_month*
PROD__Operating_hours_per_day) 
NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_1 = 
(NPV_After_tax_profit_yr1/((1+NPV_Discount_rate)^NPV_Power_yr_1)) 
NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_2 = 
(NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_2/((1+NPV_Discount_rate)^NPV_Power_yr_2)) 
NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_3 = 
(NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_3/((1+NPV_Discount_rate)^NPV_Power_yr_3)) 
NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_4 = 
(NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_4/((1+NPV_Discount_rate)^NPV_Power_yr_4)) 
NPV_Discounted_cash_flow_yr_5 = 
(NPV_After_tax_profit_yr_5/((1+NPV_Discount_rate)^NPV_Power_yr_5)) 
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NPV_Discount_rate = NPV__Adjusted_for_risk_discount_rate 
NPV_dozer_drivers_per_equipment = 2 
NPV_drilling_machine_drivers_per_equipment = 4 
NPV_Effective_price_on_appraisal = 
MRK_Expected_price_by_miners*GOVMT_Fraction_of_price_on_appraisal 
NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer = 
NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer_yearly_salary*NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer_req 
NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer_req = 1 
NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer_yearly_salary = 18000 
NPV_EOC_Average_spare_parts_cost = 
(NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers_cost+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines_cost+NPV_
EOC_Spare_parts_excavators_cost+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks_cost)/4 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_dozers = 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_dozers_yearly_req*NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon*NPV_t0_Dozer_units 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_dozers_yearly_req = 72000 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_drilling_machines = 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_drilling_machines_yearly_req*NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon*NPV_t0_Drilling_
machine_units 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_drilling_machines_yearly_req = 28800 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_excavators = 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_excavators_yearly_req*NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon*NPV_t0_Excavator_units 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_excavators_yearly_req = 64800 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_trucks = 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_trucks_yearly_req*NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon*NPV_t0_Truck_units 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_trucks_yearly_req = 54000 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers = 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers_cost*NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers_req 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers_cost = 300 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers_req = 
NPV__EOC_avg_spare_parts_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Dozer_units 
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NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines = 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines_cost*NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines_req 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines_cost = 300 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machines_req = 
NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_units*NPV__EOC_avg_spare_parts_per_equipment 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators = 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators_cost*NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators_req 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators_cost = 300 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators_req = 
NPV_t0_Excavator_units*NPV__EOC_avg_spare_parts_per_equipment 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks = 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks_cost*NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks_req 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks_cost = 300 
NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks_req = 
NPV_t0_Truck_units*NPV__EOC_avg_spare_parts_per_equipment 
NPV_excavator_drivers_per_equipment = 4 
NPV_Expected_tonnage = 
LND__Acres_per_license*PROD_Effective_tons_per_acre*MRK__Desired_mining_licenses 
NPV_Exploxives_per_acre = 10 
NPV_Fuel_cost_per_gallon = 3 
NPV_MAINT_Mechanics = 
NPV_MAINT_Mechanics_yearly_salary*NPV_MAINT_Mechanics_req 
NPV_MAINT_Mechanics_req = NPV_mechanics_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Excavator_units 
NPV_MAINT_Mechanics_yearly_salary = 3600 
NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor = 
NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor_yearly_salary*NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor_req 
NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor_req = 1 
NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor_yearly_salary = 6600 
NPV_Max_company_experience__in_the_country = 1 
NPV_Max_political_stability = 1 
NPV_Max_security_of_tenure = 1 
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NPV_mechanics_per_equipment = 0.066 
NPV_Operating_hours__per_year = 
PROD__Operating_days_per_year*PROD__Operating_hours_per_day 
NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year = 
(NPV_Required_shifts__per_year/NPV_Scheduled_shifts_per_year) 
NPV_others_per_equipment = 0.2 
NPV_Penetration_rate_in_acres_per_shift = 
PROD_Hours_per__shift*NPV_Average_penetration_in_acres__per_hour 
NPV_PER_Others = NPV_PER_Others_yearly_salary*NPV_PER_Others_req 
NPV_PER_Others_req = NPV_others_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Excavator_units 
NPV_PER_Others_yearly_salary = 960 
NPV_Pit_area_per__year = 
(MRK__Licenses_under_analysis*LND__Acres_per_license)/PROD_Mine_life 
NPV_Power_yr_1 = 1 
NPV_Power_yr_2 = 2 
NPV_Power_yr_3 = 3 
NPV_Power_yr_4 = 4 
NPV_Power_yr_5 = 5 
NPV_Pre_tax_profit = NPV_Total_revenues-NPV_Total_costs 
NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver = 
NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver_yearly_salary*NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver_req 
NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver_req = NPV_dozer_drivers_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Dozer_units 
NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver_yearly_salary = 4800 
NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver = 
NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver_yearly_salary*NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver_req 
NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver_req = 
NPV_drilling_machine_drivers_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_units 
NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver_yearly_salary = 4200 
NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver = 
NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver_yearly_salary*NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver_req 
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NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver_req = 
NPV_excavator_drivers_per_equipment*NPV_t0_Excavator_units 
NPV_PROD_Excavator_driver_yearly_salary = 4800 
NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew = 
NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew_yearly_salary*NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew_req 
NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew_req = 
NPV_t0_Excavator_units*NPV_t0_Stone_finders_per_equipment 
NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew_yearly_salary = 1200 
NPV_PROD_Truck_driver = 
NPV_PROD_Truck_driver_yearly_salary*NPV_PROD_Truck_driver_requirement 
NPV_PROD_Truck_driver_requirement = 
NPV_t0_Truck_units*NPV_truck_drivers_per_equipment 
NPV_PROD_Truck_driver_yearly_salary = 4200 
NPV_Required_shifts__per_year = 
NPV_Pit_area_per__year/NPV_Penetration_rate_in_acres_per_shift 
NPV_Risk_factor_multiplier = 
(EFF_Effect_of_environmental_and_social_regulations*EFF_Effect_of_political_stability_on_pe
rceived_risk*EFF_Effect_of_security_of_tenure_on_perceived_risk) 
NPV_Scheduled_shifts_per_year = NPV_Operating_hours__per_year/PROD_Hours_per__shift 
NPV_t0_Acre_cost = 1000 
NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment = 
(NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment_cost*NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment_units)/NPV__Customer_acqui
sition_delay_1_year 
NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment_cost = 30000 
NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment_units = 
(NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/Max_equipment__utilization_Cutting_equipment) 
NPV_t0_Dozer_cost = 127000 
NPV_t0_Dozer_units = (NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/PROD__Equipement_utilization) 
NPV_t0_Drilling_machines = 
(NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_cost*NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisition
_delay_1_year 
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NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_cost = 300000 
NPV_t0_Drilling_machine_units = 
(NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/PROD__Equipement_utilization) 
NPV_t0_Excavators = 
(NPV_t0_Excavator_cost*NPV_t0_Excavator_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisition_delay_1_ye
ar 
NPV_t0_Excavator_cost = 140000 
NPV_t0_Excavator_units = (NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/PROD__Equipement_utilization) 
NPV_t0_Explosives = NPV_t0_Explosive_cost*NPV_t0_Explosive_units 
NPV_t0_Explosive_cost = 50 
NPV_t0_Explosive_units = NPV_Exploxives_per_acre*NPV_t0_Land_in_acres 
NPV_t0_Housing = NPV_t0_Housing_cost*NPV_t0_Housing_units 
NPV_t0_Housing_cost = 8000 
NPV_t0_Housing_req__per_acre = 1/1000 
NPV_t0_Housing_units = NPV_t0_Housing_req__per_acre*NPV_t0_Land_in_acres 
NPV_t0_Land_in_acres = LND__Acres_per_license*MRK__Desired_mining_licenses 
NPV_t0_Land_purchase = NPV_t0_Land_in_acres*NPV_t0_Acre_cost 
NPV_t0_Light_vehicles = 
(NPV_t0_Light_vehicle_cost*NPV_t0_Light_vehicle_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisition_delay
_1_year 
NPV_t0_Light_vehicle_cost = 20000 
NPV_t0_Light_vehicle_units = 
(NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/Max_equipment__utilization_Light_vehicle) 
NPV_t0_Power_supply = NPV_t0_Power_supply_cost*NPV_t0_Power_supply_units 
NPV_t0_Power_supply_cost = 5000 
NPV_t0_Power_supply_units = 
NPV_t0_Land_in_acres*NPV_t0_Power_supply__req_per_acre 
NPV_t0_Power_supply__req_per_acre = 1/300 
NPV_t0_Repair_equipment = 
(NPV_t0_Repair_equipment_cost*NPV_t0_Repair_equipment_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisit
ion_delay_1_year 
 143 
NPV_t0_Repair_equipment_cost = 30000 
NPV_t0_Repair_equipment_units = 
(NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/Max_equipment__utilization_Repair_equipment) 
NPV_t0_Roads = NPV_t0_Road_cost*NPV_t0_Road_units 
NPV_t0_Road_cost = 5000 
NPV_t0_Road_req__per_acre = 2/500 
NPV_t0_Road_units = NPV_t0_Land_in_acres*NPV_t0_Road_req__per_acre 
NPV_t0_Stone_finders_per_equipment = 7 
NPV_t0_Total_cash_outflows = 
NPV_t0_Total_civil_works_cost+NPV_t0_Total_development_costs+NPV_t0_Total_equipmen
t_costs+NPV_t0_Total_other_equipment_costs 
NPV_t0_Total_civil_works_cost = 
NPV_t0_Housing+NPV_t0_Power_supply+NPV_t0_Roads+NPV_t0_Water_supply 
NPV_t0_Total_development_costs = NPV_t0_Explosives+NPV_t0_Land_purchase 
NPV_t0_Total_equipment_costs = 
NPV__t0_Dozers+NPV_t0_Drilling_machines+NPV_t0_Excavators+NPV_t0_Trucks 
NPV_t0_Total_other_equipment_costs = 
NPV_t0_Cutting_equipment+NPV_t0_Light_vehicles+NPV_t0_Repair_equipment 
NPV_t0_Trucks = 
(NPV_t0_Truck_cost*NPV_t0_Truck_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisition_delay_1_year 
NPV_t0_Truck_cost = 140000 
NPV_t0_Truck_units = (NPV_Operating_shifts_per_year/PROD__Equipement_utilization) 
NPV_t0_Water_supply = NPV_t0_Water_supply_cost*NPV_t0_Water_supply_units 
NPV_t0_Water_supply_cost = 5000 
NPV_t0_Water_supply_units = 
NPV_t0_Land_in_acres*NPV_t0_Water_supply__req_per_acre 
NPV_t0_Water_supply__req_per_acre = 1/300 
NPV_Taxes_rate = 0 
NPV_Tax_pymts_on_raw_production = 
(NPV_Expected_tonnage*NPV_Effective_price_on_appraisal)*GOVMT_Tax_fraction_on_raw_
production 
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NPV_Total_administration_labor_costs = 
NPV_ADM_Finance_&_accounting+NPV_ADM_General_manager+NPV_ADM_Procurement 
NPV_Total_costs = NPV_Total_indirect_costs+NPV_Total_labor_costs 
NPV_Total_engineering_labor_costs = NPV_ENG_Mining_engineer 
NPV_Total_indirect_costs = NPV_Total_pit_and_maintenance_costs 
NPV_Total_labor_costs = 
NPV_Total_administration_labor_costs+NPV_Total_engineering_labor_costs+NPV_Total_main
tenance_labor_costs+NPV_Total_other_personnel_labor_costs+NPV_Total_production_labor_c
osts 
NPV_Total_maintenance_labor_costs = 
NPV_MAINT_Mechanics+NPV_MAINT_Workshop_supervisor 
NPV_Total_other_personnel_labor_costs = NPV_PER_Others 
NPV_Total_pit_and_maintenance_costs = 
NPV_EOC_Fuel_dozers+NPV_EOC_Fuel_drilling_machines+NPV_EOC_Fuel_excavators+NP
V_EOC_Fuel_trucks+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_dozers+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_drilling_machi
nes+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_excavators+NPV_EOC_Spare_parts_trucks 
NPV_Total_production_labor_costs = 
NPV_PROD_Dozer_driver+NPV_PROD_Drilling_machine_driver+NPV_PROD_Excavator_dri
ver+NPV_PROD_Stone_finder_crew+NPV_PROD_Truck_driver 
NPV_Total_revenues = NPV_Total_revenues_before_emporium_tax*(1-
GOVMT_Emporium_government_tax) 
NPV_Total_revenues_before_emporium_tax = NPV__Expected_revenue 
NPV_truck_drivers_per_equipment = 2 
NPV__Adjusted_for_risk_discount_rate = NPV__Normal_discount_rate+((-
4*SMTH1(NPV_Risk_factor_multiplier,6/12)+11)/100) 
NPV__Customer_acquisition_delay_1_year = 1 
NPV__EOC_avg_spare_parts_per_equipment = 5 
NPV__Expected_revenue = (MRK_Expected_price_by_miners*NPV_Expected_tonnage)-
NPV_Tax_pymts_on_raw_production 
NPV__Normal_discount_rate = 0.1 
 145 
NPV__t0_Dozers = 
(NPV_t0_Dozer_cost*NPV_t0_Dozer_units)/NPV__Customer_acquisition_delay_1_year 
PROD_Actual_equipment__order = 
(PROD__Backlog_gap/PROD__Customer_acquisition_delay)+PROD__Mining_equipment__sr
apping_rate 
PROD_Desired_delivery_rate = PROD__Order_backlog/PROD_Target__delivery_delay 
PROD_Effective_production_capacity = 
(PROD_Equipment_tilization__fraction*PROD__Max_producion__capacity)*1 
PROD_Effective_tons_per_acre = (PROD__Normal_tons__per_acre)*1+(IF 
SWITCH_SCE__Tonnage_1=1 THEN 
PROD__Normal_tons__per_acre*SCE_1_Best_is__yet_to_come ELSE 
PROD__Normal_tons__per_acre*SCE_1_Best_is_gone)*0 
PROD_Equipment_tilization__fraction = 
SMTH1(EFF_Effect_of_expected_markup_on_equipment_utilization,PROD_Equipment_utilizati
on__adjustment_time) 
PROD_Equipment_utilization__adjustment_time = 1/12 
PROD_Hours_per__shift = 7 
PROD_Market_share_UMG = STEP(0.05,2000)+STEP(0.05,2003)+STEP(0.16,2006.5) 
PROD_Max_acres_handled__per_mining_equipment_per_month = 0.1 
PROD_Mine_life = 8 
PROD_Min_order_processing_time = 6/12 
PROD_Operating_hours__per_year = 
PROD__Operating_days_per_year*PROD__Operating_hours_per_day 
PROD_Operating_shifts_per_year = 
(PROD_Required_shifts__per_year/PROD_Scheduled_shifts_per_year) 
PROD_Order_rate_UMG = PROD_Order_rate_market*PROD_Market_share_UMG 
PROD_Penetration_rate_in_acres_per_shift = 
PROD_Hours_per__shift*PROD__Average_penetration_in_acres__per_hour 
PROD_Pit_area_per__year = LND__Acres_transferred/PROD_Mine_life 
PROD_Required_shifts__per_year = 
PROD_Pit_area_per__year/PROD_Penetration_rate_in_acres_per_shift 
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PROD_Scheduled_shifts_per_year = 
PROD_Operating_hours__per_year/PROD_Hours_per__shift 
PROD_Target__delivery_delay = 1/12 
PROD__Average_penetration_in_acres__per_hour = 
PROD_Max_acres_handled__per_mining_equipment_per_month/(PROD__Operating_hours_p
er_day*PROD__Days_in_a_month)  
PROD__Backlog_gap = PROD__Equiment_to_be_purchased-PROD__Order_backlog 
PROD__Customer_acquisition_delay = 2/12 
PROD__Days_in_a_month = 30 
PROD__Desired_fleet = PROD_Operating_shifts_per_year/PROD__Equipement_utilization 
PROD__Equiment_to_be_purchased = IF SWITCH__Financial_restrictions=1 THEN 
MIN(PROD__Desired_fleet,FIN_Budget_for_equipment) ELSE PROD__Desired_fleet 
PROD__Equipement_utilization = 0.8 
PROD__Jade_production_in_tons = LND___exploitation_rate*PROD_Effective_tons_per_acre 
PROD__Max_acres_handled_per_mining__equipment_per_year = 
PROD_Max_acres_handled__per_mining_equipment_per_month*PROD__Working_months_pe
r_year 
PROD__Max_delivery__rate = 
PROD__UMG_mining_equipment_inventory/PROD_Min_order_processing_time 
PROD__Max_producion__capacity = 
PROD_Customer_mining_equipment*PROD__Max_acres_handled_per_mining__equipment_pe
r_year 
PROD__Normal_tons__per_acre = 12 
PROD__Operating_days_per_year = IF SWITCH__Seasonality=1 THEN 240 ELSE 360 
PROD__Operating_hours_per_day = 20 
PROD__Scrapping_delay = 5 
PROD__Working_months_per_year = IF SWITCH__Seasonality=1 THEN 8 ELSE 12 
PRO_Min_time_for__depletion = 1 
PRO__Dillution_fraction = 0.25 
PRO__Equipment_used_per_year = 
LND___exploitation_rate/PROD__Max_acres_handled_per_mining__equipment_per_year 
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SCE_1_Best_is_gone = SCE_Tonnage__input_2 
SCE_1_Best_is__yet_to_come = SCE_Tonnage__input_1 
SCE_1_Mining_rush = SCE_Licenses_input_1*RM__Licenses_granted 
SCE_2_Responsible_mining = SCE_Licenses_input_2*RM__Licenses_granted 
SCE_Licenses_input_1 = 1+STEP(2,2012) 
SCE_Licenses_input_2 = 1-STEP(0.7,2012) 
SCE_Tonnage__input_1 = 1+step(1,2012)  
SCE_Tonnage__input_2 = 1-step(0.7,2012) 
SWITCH_Noise = 0 
SWITCH_SCE_Licenses_1 = 1 
SWITCH_SCE__Tonnage_1 = 0 
SWITCH__Financial_restrictions = 0 
SWITCH__Mine_development__analysis = 0 
SWITCH__Population_growth = 1 
SWITCH__Seasonality = 1 
EFF_Effect_of_acres_availability__on_exploitation = 
GRAPH(LND_Max_acres__exploitation_rate/PROD_Effective_production_capacity) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.2, 0.2), (0.4, 0.4), (0.6, 0.6), (0.8, 0.8), (1.00, 1.00), (1.20, 1.00), (1.40, 1.00), (1.60, 
1.00), (1.80, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00) 
EFF_Effect_of_environmental_and_social_regulations = 
GRAPH(NPV_Actual_company_experience__in_the_country/NPV_Max_company_experience_
_in_the_country) 
(0.00, 0.05), (0.2, 0.42), (0.4, 0.68), (0.6, 0.865), (0.8, 0.985), (1.00, 1.00) 
EFF_Effect_of_expected_markup_on_equipment_utilization = 
GRAPH(MRK__Expected_markup) 
(0.00, 1.00), (0.8, 1.00), (1.60, 1.00), (2.40, 1.00), (3.20, 1.00), (4.00, 1.00), (4.80, 1.01), (5.60, 1.15), 
(6.40, 1.18), (7.20, 1.20), (8.00, 1.20) 
EFF_Effect_of_political_stability_on_perceived_risk = 
GRAPH(NPV_Actual_political_stability/NPV_Max_political_stability) 
(0.00, 0.05), (0.2, 0.42), (0.4, 0.68), (0.6, 0.865), (0.8, 0.985), (1.00, 1.00) 
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EFF_Effect_of_security_of_tenure_on_perceived_risk = 
GRAPH(NPV_Actual_security_of_tenure/NPV_Max_security_of_tenure) 
(0.00, 0.05), (0.2, 0.42), (0.4, 0.68), (0.6, 0.865), (0.8, 0.985), (1.00, 1.00) 
EFF__Effect_of_land_utilization__fraction_on_license_demand = 
GRAPH(LDN__Land_utilization_fraction) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.05), (0.2, 0.12), (0.3, 0.2), (0.4, 0.285), (0.5, 0.37), (0.6, 0.52), (0.7, 0.68), (0.8, 
0.815), (0.9, 0.94), (1, 0.98) 
MRK_Equilibrium_per_capita_consumption = 
GRAPH((MRK__Effective_jade_price_per_ton)*1) 
(12000, 1.95), (47273, 2.92), (82545, 3.97), (117818, 4.95), (153091, 5.63), (188364, 6.75), (223636, 
7.88), (258909, 8.55), (294182, 9.67), (329455, 11.0), (364727, 12.6), (400000, 14.4) 
MRK__Desired_mining_licenses = GRAPH(MRK_Expected_price_by_miners) 
(12000, 455), (50800, 578), (89600, 665), (128400, 823), (167200, 980), (206000, 1155), (244800, 2223), 
(283600, 2730), (322400, 3010), (361200, 3290), (400000, 3325) 
MRK__Effective_jade_price_per_ton = GRAPH(MRK_Relative_inventory__coverage) 
(0.00, 400000), (0.8, 384000), (1.60, 350000), (2.40, 150000), (3.20, 71000), (4.00, 64000), (4.80, 
49000), (5.60, 42000), (6.40, 41000), (7.20, 38000), (8.00, 34000), (8.80, 31500), (9.60, 27000), (10.4, 
21000), (11.2, 17000), (12.0, 12000) 
PROD_Order_fulfillment__ratio = 
GRAPH(PROD__Max_delivery__rate/PROD_Desired_delivery_rate) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.5, 0.3), (1.00, 0.8), (1.50, 1.00), (2.00, 1.00), (2.50, 1.00), (3.00, 1.00), (3.50, 1.00), 
(4.00, 1.00), (4.50, 1.00), (5.00, 1.00) 
RM_accumulated__sales_UMG = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 1.00), (2001, 1.00), (2002, 51.0), (2003, 105), (2004, 207), (2005, 456), (2006, 634), (2007, 1282), 
(2008, 1910), (2009, 2409), (2010, 3479), (2011, 4679) 
RM_emporium_revenues__per_year = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 4.2e+007), (2001, 2e+007), (2002, 5e+007), (2003, 2.3e+007), (2004, 3.5e+007), (2005, 
7.7e+007), (2007, 2.3e+008), (2008, 3.7e+008), (2009, 3.3e+008), (2010, 3.1e+008), (2011, 1.9e+009) 
RM_jade_production_in_tons = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 11096), (2001, 8174), (2002, 10879), (2003, 10755), (2004, 14988), (2005, 20390), (2006, 20458), 
(2007, 20235), (2008, 32921), (2009, 25795), (2010, 46810), (2011, 46810) 
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RM_Order_rate_UMG = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 1.00), (2001, 0.00), (2002, 50.0), (2003, 54.0), (2004, 171), (2005, 180), (2006, 178), (2007, 648), 
(2008, 628), (2009, 499), (2010, 1070), (2011, 1200) 
RM__Licenses_granted = GRAPH(TIME) 
(2000, 1000), (2001, 1100), (2002, 900), (2003, 1200), (2004, 2200), (2005, 1700), (2006, 1800), (2007, 
5100), (2008, 1000), (2009, 5900), (2010, 10600), (2011, 9800), (2012, 5450), (2013, 9450), (2014, 
9050), (2015, 9100), (2016, 12800), (2017, 10400), (2018, 11500), (2019, 17500), (2020, 14100), (2021, 
14800), (2022, 18400) 
 
